

# Taiwan Program on Security and Diplomacy

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## One Europe, many policies: balancing EU relations with Taiwan and China

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- The **Taiwan Program on Security and Diplomacy** aims to enhance understanding of key issues related to Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait while fostering cooperation between Taiwan, France, and the broader European Union. Through publications, conferences, and interviews with policymakers and leading Taiwanese experts, the program provides insights into security and diplomatic dynamics.

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# Introduction

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With Taiwan increasingly in the spotlight, European states face greater challenges in managing their relations with both Beijing and Taipei. Engagement with either side requires carefully navigating each country's own "One China policy". As China increases its pressure and more Europeans than ever interact with Taiwan, there is a greater need to understand what underpins the evolving balance.

This paper will explain why the words and symbols related to this policy matter so much and how to weigh the compromises that all European Union (EU) member states have struck. Some recent incidents show how language has real consequences for relations with China, international security, and economic interests.

Following a letter from the Presidents of the European Council and Commission stating that Taiwan's representative office in Lithuania under the name "Taiwan" does not contradict the European One China Policy,<sup>1</sup> the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted angrily that the One China Principle is the "universal consensus of the international community" and told the EU to "adopt a correct position".<sup>2</sup>

Flying back from Beijing after a state visit, French President Macron made headlines when he remarked that Europe has no interest in an "acceleration" on the subject of Taiwan, arguing that the European Union's strategic autonomy would be hurt if it had to "adapt to the U.S. rhythm and Chinese overreaction".<sup>3</sup> As part of the furious reactions, *The Wall Street Journal's* editorial board stated this would harm American support for Europe's security.<sup>4</sup>

Although Germany does not maintain official relations with the Republic of China, as Taiwan is formally known, its education minister visited the island in 2023 to witness the signing of a cooperation agreement with the Taiwanese government's National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).<sup>5</sup> Although Beijing protested this "vile conduct", Berlin faced no further consequences.<sup>6</sup>

The sections that follow seek to explain the incidents above. The first part introduces the One China concepts used in relations with Taiwan. The second part explains the waves in which the One China Policies of the EU member states have developed. The third and final part discusses the practice in the space available within One China Policies and what this means for Europe.

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<sup>1</sup> Staff writer, with CNA, Brussels, "EU Slams China's Moves in Taiwan Office Dispute", *Taipei Times*, 21 October 2021.

<sup>2</sup> "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's Remarks on Joint Letter by Presidents of Two EU Institutions on Taiwan-Related Issue Concerning Lithuania in Response to Letter by Some European Legislators", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC*, 30 October 2021.

<sup>3</sup> Nicolas Barré, "Emmanuel Macron : 'L'autonomie stratégique doit être le combat de l'Europe'", *Les Echos*, 9 April 2023.

<sup>4</sup> Editorial Board, "Macron Blunders on Taiwan – and Ukraine", *The Wall Street Journal*, 9 April 2023.

<sup>5</sup> "A Historic Milestone in Taiwan-Germany Cooperation! First German Minister Visits Taiwan in 26 Years to Sign a Cooperation Arrangement with the NSTC", National Science and Technology Council, 21 March 2023.

<sup>6</sup> Fabian Hamacher, Yew Lun Tian, Ben Blanchard, "China Protests 'vile' Taiwan Visit by German Minister", *Reuters*, 21 March 2023.

# 1. One China

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According to the current government in Beijing, the Republic of China (ROC, *zhōnghuá mínguó*) founded in 1912 ceased to exist when Mao Zedong proclaimed the Popular Republic of China (PRC, *zhōnghuá rénmin gònghéguó*) on 1 October 1949 upon the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s victory in the Chinese Civil War. The CCP says China has been represented by its PRC since then, inheriting all the rights and privileges of the extinguished ROC.

The new Beijing government was however unable to take over several islands from their defeated foe, including Taiwan. The CCP claimed that these were still awaiting "liberation". However, from "temporary capital" Taipei, the remnant of the Chinese Nationalists claimed that their ROC continued to exist, and in fact represented the only legitimate government of all of China.

Taiwan's complicated history is often obscured by nationalist narratives from various sides. Originally inhabited by Austronesian peoples, it was first colonized by the Dutch in 1624, until they were kicked out by the half-Japanese Ming-loyalist pirate-king Zheng Chenggong in 1662. His fledgling state was defeated by the new Qing Empire in 1684, which made Taiwan part of a Chinese empire for the first time.<sup>7</sup>

Taiwan was a frontier zone for centuries as Han Chinese settlement slowly grew. Part of Fujian province, it only became a province in its own right in 1887. Shortly afterwards, in 1895, the Qing were forced to cede Taiwan to Japan as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, still not having established full control over the island's eastern parts. Taiwan remained a Japanese colony until the end of the World War II. In 1945, the Republic of China took possession of it.<sup>8</sup>

After their defeat in the Chinese Civil War, Kuomintang (KMT) leader Chiang Kai-shek and his followers fled to the island. One million Mainlanders (*wàishěng rén*)<sup>9</sup> joined six million Taiwanese (*běnsěng rén*) already there. Together they built a new state, with American help, on top of the Japanese colonial foundations, using the ROC name and institutions.<sup>10</sup>

During the Cold War, both sides maintained that there was only one China and that their state represented it. To substantiate this, the PRC and the ROC pointed to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations of 1943 and 1945 – declarations in which the Allied leaders promised "Formosa" to China –, and Taipei to the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, in which Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan without specifying to whom. When a country established formal diplomatic relations with one "China", the other "China" broke off the relationship. The most famous example was the US switch to Beijing in 1979, which had been a treaty ally of Taipei up until that moment.

Since the beginning of democratization in the 1990s, this claim has become largely a formality for Taipei. For most Taiwanese, "status quo" means independence from the PRC and "independence" means the abolition of the ROC.<sup>11</sup> The jurisdiction of the ROC was in practice limited to what we now call "Taiwan" by the constitutional amendment of 1991 that allowed the government to pass laws regulating interaction with the "Mainland area".<sup>12</sup> Explicitly giving up the claim to "China", however, would be a *casus belli* for

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<sup>7</sup> Tonio Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007.

<sup>8</sup> Lin Hsiao-ting, *Accidental State: Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2016.

<sup>9</sup> Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, *The Great Exodus from China: Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Modern Taiwan*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021, p. 63.

<sup>10</sup> Sense Hofsted, "Taiwan's Democratic Journey and Stabilising National Identity", *9DASHLINE*, 9 December 2020.

<sup>11</sup> Lev Nachman, Brian Hioe, "No, Taiwan's President Isn't 'Pro-Independence'", *The Diplomat*, 23 April 2020.

<sup>12</sup> Pasha L. Hsieh, "The Taiwan Question and the One-China Policy: Legal Challenges with Renewed Momentum", *Die Friedens-Warte*, vol. 84, n° 3, 2009, pp. 59-81.

Beijing and split the KMT. The current Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government has shifted language, talking about “Republic of China (Taiwan)” as opposed to the opposition KMT’s focus on the ROC.<sup>13</sup>

## 1.1 China’s “One China Principle”

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Beijing firmly believes that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Since the 1960s, this position has been disseminated externally in the form of the so-called “One China Principle” (*yī ge zhōngguó yuánzé*, abbreviated as *yī zhōng yuánzé*). It consists of three claims:

- Taiwan is an inseparable part of China;
- The PRC is the sole legal government of China; and
- There is only one China in the world.<sup>14</sup>

In China, propaganda guidelines therefore forbid speaking about “China and Taiwan”. Rather, it requires using “the Chinese Mainland”<sup>15</sup> (*zhōngguó dàlù*) and “Taiwan, China” (*zhōngguó táiwān*).

The One China Principle denies the existence of Taiwan as an independent entity internationally. Beijing wrongly argues that the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 supports the One China Principle’s claim that Taiwan belongs to China,<sup>16</sup> even though this 1971 resolution – in an explicit compromise at the time – only stipulated that China’s UN seat belongs to the People’s Republic and not to “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek”.

Taiwan’s inability to join the United Nations (UN) as the ROC alongside the PRC forms a contrast with Korea and Germany. Seoul and Pyongyang both claim to represent the “real” Korea, with sovereignty over the entire peninsula. Yet South Korea is a member of the UN as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The same solution allowed West and East Germany to both join the UN system.

China also pressures its diplomatic partners to recognize some degree of One China as a condition for establishing relations. Based on all of the above, Beijing consistently claims that there is an “international consensus” on the One China Principle. This is incorrect, although it is succeeding in expanding support for its positions globally.

## 1.2 European One China Policies

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Although forced to deal with China’s demands, other countries do not blindly adopt Beijing’s One China *Principle* wholesale. Instead, most engage with China on the basis of a “One China *Policy*” (*yī ge zhōngguó zhèngcè*, abbreviated as *yī zhōng zhèngcè*). Each country has its own policy.<sup>17</sup> The content of these policies is the combined result of negotiations during the establishment of formal diplomatic relations and the developments that followed.

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<sup>13</sup> Sense Hofstede, “How the China Cleavage Shapes Taiwan’s Elections”, *Clingendael Spectator*, 28 November 2023.

<sup>14</sup> “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue”, *Taiwan Affairs Office*, 2000.

<sup>15</sup> “Mainland China” would also be undesirable, because it suggests there might be other kinds of “China”.

<sup>16</sup> Jessica Drun, Bonnie S. Glaser, “The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations”, *Insights*, German Marshall Fund, 24 March 2022.

<sup>17</sup> Chong Ja Ian, “The Many ‘One Chinas’: Multiple Approaches to Taiwan and China”, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 9 February 2023.

Some countries do indeed explicitly recognize that Taiwan is part of the PRC. In many cases, though, they limit themselves to the recognition that the PRC is the only “China”. A lot is possible under this policy. Most European countries exchange “representative offices” with Taipei that function like *de facto* embassies and have regular interactions.

The EU and the PRC trace their diplomatic relations back to 1975, when the European Economic Community (EEC) established ties with Beijing. At that time, Sir Christopher Soames, then Vice-President of the EEC Commission, declared that the community “does not entertain any official relations or enter into any agreements with Taiwan” before adding:

**“I explained that matters such as recognition of states did not come into the responsibility of the community. But I pointed out to the minister that all the member states of the community recognized the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China, and have taken positions with regard to the Taiwan question acceptable to the People’s Republic”.**<sup>18</sup>

The Chinese side appears to have drawn far-reaching conclusions from Soames’ statement, pertaining to today’s EU and its member states. In August 2022, Beijing’s mission in Brussels stated it created “binding legal obligations for the EU and its member states”.<sup>19</sup> Then Chinese Ambassador to the EU, Zhang Ming, also invoked the 50-year old declaration in reaction to the Taiwanese office in Vilnius.<sup>20</sup> More recently, in a 2022 interview with the *South China Morning Post*, then incoming ambassador Fu Cong rejected an EU-Taiwan investment agreement proposed by MEPs visiting Taipei by stating that China has a voice in determining what aligns with Europe’s One China policies.<sup>21</sup>

Brussels’ standpoint is rather different. In *Elements for a new EU strategy on China* from 2016, the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy state:

**“The EU confirms its ‘One China’ policy. [...] The EU confirms its commitment to continuing to develop its relations with Taiwan and to supporting the shared values underpinning its system of governance. The EU should continue to support the constructive development of cross-Strait relations as part of keeping the Asia-Pacific region at peace. [...] The EU should promote practical solutions regarding Taiwan’s participation in international frameworks, wherever this is consistent with the EU’s ‘One China’ policy and the EU’s policy objectives”.**<sup>22</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Hong Kong AFP, “Soames Holds Press Conference, Meets Chou En-Lai, Hosts Banquet”, *FBIS Daily Report: PRC* 1 (91): A19, 1975. See also: Christopher Soames, “Speech by Sir Christopher Soames, Vice-President of the Commission, during a European Parliament Debate on China. Strasbourg, 18 June 1975”, [Archive of European Integration](#), University of Pittsburgh, June 18, 1975.

<sup>19</sup> “Questions and Answers Concerning the Taiwan Question (4): What Political Commitments Have the United States and the European Union Made on the Taiwan Question?”, [Mission of the PRC to the European Union](#), Brussels, 19 August 2022.

<sup>20</sup> Zhang Ming 张明, “关于‘驻立陶宛台湾代表处’, 张明大使原话引述了欧方在与中国建交之初的承诺”, [Mission of the PRC to the European Union](#), Brussels, 18 November 2021.

<sup>21</sup> “Transcript of Ambassador Fu Cong’s Interview with the South China Morning Post”, [Mission of the PRC to the European Union](#), Brussels, December 23, 2022.

<sup>22</sup> European Commission, and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, *Elements for a New EU Strategy on China*, [Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council](#), Brussels, 22 June 2016.

Table 1. EU member states' One China Policies

COUNTRY	EU MEMBERSHIP	PRC RECOGNITION	PRC DIPLOMATIC TIES	PRC FULL DIPLOMATIC TIES	ACCEPTS PRINCIPLE	ONE CHINA	SOLE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA	TAIWAN PART OF CHINA
Austria	01/01/1995		28/05/1971	28/05/1971	NO	NO	YES	NO
Belgium	01/01/1958	25/10/1971	25/10/1971	25/10/1971	NO	NO	YES	Takes note
Bulgaria	01/01/2007		04/10/1949	04/10/1949	NO	YES	YES	YES
Croatia	01/07/2013		13/05/1992	13/05/1992	NO	NO	YES	YES
Cyprus	01/05/2004			14/12/1971	NO	NO	YES	NO
Czechia	01/05/2004	06/10/1949	06/10/1949	06/10/1949	YES	NO	NO	YES
Denmark	01/01/1973	09/01/1950	11/05/1950	15/02/1956	NO	NO	NO	NO
Estonia	01/05/2004		11/09/1991	11/09/1991	NO	NO	YES	YES
European Union	01/01/1958			07/05/1975	NO	NO	YES	NO
Finland	01/01/1995	13/01/1950	28/10/1950	28/10/1950	NO	NO	NO	NO
France	01/01/1958			27/01/1964	NO	NO	YES	YES
Germany	01/01/1958		11/10/1972	11/10/1972	NO	NO	NO	NO
Greece	01/01/1981	05/06/1972	05/06/1972	05/06/1972	2006	NO	YES	Takes note
Hungary	01/05/2004	04/10/1949	06/10/1949	06/10/1949	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ireland	01/01/1973			22/06/1979	NO	NO	YES	NO
Italy	01/01/1958		06/11/1970	06/11/1970	NO	NO	YES	Takes note
Latvia	01/05/2004		12/09/1991	12/09/1991	NO	NO	YES	YES
Lithuania	01/05/2004		14/09/1991	14/09/1991	NO	NO	YES	YES
Luxembourg	01/01/1958		16/11/1972	Jun/78	NO	NO	YES	NO
Malta	01/05/2004		31/01/1972	31/01/1972	NO	NO	YES	Takes note
Netherlands	01/01/1958	27/03/1950	19/11/1954	16/05/1972	NO	NO	YES	Respects
Poland	01/05/2004	05/10/1949	07/10/1949	07/10/1949	NO	YES	YES	YES
Portugal	01/01/1986		08/02/1979	08/02/1979	2018	NO	YES	YES
Romania	01/01/2007		05/10/1949	05/10/1949	YES	YES	YES	YES
Slovakia	01/05/2004	06/10/1949	06/10/1949	06/10/1949	YES	YES	YES	YES
Slovenia	01/05/2004	27/04/1992	12/05/1992	12/05/1992	1996	1996	YES	YES
Spain	01/01/1986		09/03/1973	09/03/1973	2005	NO	YES	Recognizes
Sweden	01/01/1995	14/01/1950	09/05/1950	09/05/1950	NO	NO	NO	NO

## 2. Five waves of European One China Policies

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Given the limited foreign and security competences of the European Union, it is the One China Policies of the member states that matter much more than the Commission's. Countries' One China Policies develop over time. However, they all trace back to the original moment when diplomatic ties with China are established, moments generally marked by a Joint Declaration.

As you can see in Table 1, you can parse these One China Policy statements in relation to the three explicit claims that make up China's One China Principle. Appendix 1 describes the six waves in which these policies developed. The most illustrative cases are explained below. The years refer to joint declarations and statements listed in Appendix 2.

### 2.1 First wave

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The first wave of diplomatic recognitions of the PRC came soon after Mao Zedong proclaimed his "New China" in 1949. In the case of Europe, they came in two flavors: Soviet-controlled states welcoming China to the communist camp and the Nordic or neutral states. Beijing did not yet have a fully-fledged One China Principle. Instead, the new Chinese government insisted on its counterparts breaking off ties with the ROC and opposing Taipei's occupation of China's seat in the UN.<sup>23</sup>

Denmark, Finland, and Sweden all established full diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1950, carefully following unilateral recognition by the United Kingdom. Unlike the socialist countries, they did have to negotiate, but the stakes were limited.<sup>24</sup> The PRC was still working on establishing the conventions for its interaction with the world. Beijing had not yet devised the current Joint Declarations. There were no public commitments on Taiwan.

The same lack of public statements applies to the newly communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania all established diplomatic relations with Beijing in October 1949, mere days after the proclamation of the PRC. They supported the PRC's claims in the United Nations.

One unique kind of half-relations appeared in Western Europe. Seeing themselves as Asian powers with a need to deal with the reality, both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom recognized Beijing in 1950 already. However, as part of its "cleaning the house" policy, Mao Zedong was in no rush to establish full ties with these "imperialist" powers. The Netherlands' *de jure* rather than "sole legal" recognition of the Beijing government and its lack of active opposition to Taipei in the UN meant it only got to send an envoy whose sole task was to negotiate the final recognition, a task that was suspended on the outbreak of the Korean War.<sup>25</sup>

Austria had also been open to recognizing the PRC in 1950 but held back. At first this was due to worries about the views of the four powers occupying the country post-1945, but the outbreak of the Korean War put a definitive end to Vienna's moves. Fear of Taipei

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<sup>23</sup> Fukuda Madoka, "The Normalization of Sino-French Diplomatic Relations in 1964 and the Formation of the 'One-China' Principle: Negotiations over Breaking French Diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China Government and the Recognition of the PRC as the Sole Legitimate Government", *World Political Science*, vol. 8, n° 1, 2012, p. 256.

<sup>24</sup> Marita Siika, "China and the Nordic Countries, 1950-1970", *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 18, n° 2, 1983, p. 103.

<sup>25</sup> Vincent K.L. Chang, *Forgotten Diplomacy: The Modern Remaking of Dutch-Chinese Relations, 1927-1950*, Brill, Leiden, 2019, p. 412.



using its Security Council seat to block Austrian UN membership or Vienna hosting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) prolonged its policy of not recognizing either PRC or ROC.<sup>26</sup>

## 2.2 Second wave

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The second wave of recognition came after the Sino-Soviet split and during a period of *détente* in the Cold War. The separation between China and Taiwan was now clear. The growing number of newly independent former European colonies changed the balance of votes in the UN. Taipei's continued pretensions to represent China became increasingly untenable.

A resurging Europe meanwhile had more freedom to act independently from American desires. When the UN General Assembly voted to assign the China seat to the PRC with Resolution 2758 in 1971, more and more Europeans switched. This is the period when Beijing developed the concept of Joint Declarations that contain a degree of commitment to One China.

France was the first major Western power to recognize the PRC. Paris successfully resisted Chinese demands to accept any One China claim and did not even break off ties with the ROC first before establishing ties with the PRC.<sup>27</sup> Its Joint Declaration of 27 January 1964 is just one sentence announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations. China stated its One China Principle in an oral statement the day after.<sup>28</sup>

However, in the process of its talks with Paris, Beijing rehearsed its One China demands. It subsequently employed these with actual success in negotiations with former French colonies in Africa. It was then that Beijing developed the practice of having countries recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China in a signed Joint Declaration. To counter the "wrong" impression created by the French talks that it would accept any kind of "Two Chinas", Beijing launched a public campaign too.<sup>29</sup>

West Germany is also a special case. Beijing had a communist partner in East Berlin and could see parallels in the split of Germany. However, Bonn had never recognized the ROC.<sup>30</sup> The *Ostpolitik* of Chancellor Willy Brandt led to a *rapprochement* between the two Germanies and better ties with Eastern European countries. This opened the way for talks with Beijing. In 1972, China and the Federal Republic established relations in a similar one-line Joint Declaration. West Germany was not even pressured to mention Taiwan, though Bonn promised strong restrictions on its officials' interactions with Taiwan.<sup>31</sup>

All other Western European countries were part of the new model of agreeing on explicit language to express accommodation between Beijing's position and that of the other country. Still, there are important differences. We have two groups: one group of statements does mention Taiwan, one group does not.

Firstly, the Joint Declarations of neutral Austria (1971) and Ireland (1979) as well as Cyprus (1971) and Luxembourg (1972) do recognize the claim that the PRC is the sole

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<sup>26</sup> Maximilian Graf, Wolfgang Mueller, "Austria and China, 1949–1989: A Slow Rapprochement", in Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss, Valeria Zanier (ed.), *Europe and China in the Cold War: Exchanges Beyond the Bloc Logic and the Sino-Soviet Split*, Brill, Leiden, 2019, p. 22, p. 24.

<sup>27</sup> It was Taipei that broke off ties with France on 10 February 1964, ahead of the arrival of the Chinese *chargé d'affaires* (Martin Albers, *Britain, France, West Germany and the PRC, 1969–1982: The European Dimension of China's Great Transition*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016, p. 25.

<sup>28</sup> Fukuda Madoka, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 269.

<sup>30</sup> Martin Albers, *op. cit.*, p. 28, p. 56.

<sup>31</sup> Gunter Schubert, "The European Dimension of German-Taiwanese Relations: A Critical Assessment", *CERI-SciencesPo*, Paris, 2001, p. 5.

legal government of China. But they make no mention of Taiwan. Austria was excused by reference to its neutrality.<sup>32</sup>

The second group contains a variation of acknowledgement of China's position on Taiwan. The biggest group, consisting of Italy (1970), Belgium (1971), Malta (1972), and Greece (1972), merely "takes note" (*zhùyì dào*) of China's claim that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. The Netherlands (1972), which got movement again for its stalled 1950s talk after changing its position in the UN,<sup>33</sup> tried the same formulation but was forced to use "respects" (*zūnzhòng*) instead.<sup>34</sup>

Late Francoist Spain (1973) went slightly further with "recognize" (*chéngrèn*). The clearest was Portugal (1979), not too long after its Carnation Revolution and with a shaky hold on its colony of Macao in southern China. It is unique in taking the position itself that Taiwan is part of the PRC.

## 2.3 Third wave

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The third wave consists of changes to the positions of only two countries, the Netherlands and France. Both had sold weapons to Taiwan in 1981 and 1991-92 respectively, despite having formal ties with China. As a consequence, they had to make amends with a resurgent Beijing in order to not miss out on China's growing diplomatic and economic might.

In 1980-81, the Netherlands greenlit the Taiwanese request to purchase two Zwaardvis-class diesel submarines to help save its ailing RSV docks. The result was that Beijing lowered bilateral diplomatic relations back to that of *chargé d'affaires* level from 1981 to 1984.<sup>35</sup>

According to Reuters, part of the deal to return ambassadors to Beijing and The Hague was a Dutch promise not to sell weapons to Taiwan again.<sup>36</sup> The refusal of another request in the early 1990s<sup>37</sup> led to a rule in 1992 not to sell weapons to Taiwan<sup>38</sup> around a time when Germany also openly refused to sell submarines.<sup>39</sup>

France's case is much more extreme, in both sale and concessions. In the early 1990s, also to shore up its defense industry, France sold six La Fayette-class frigates and sixty Mirage 2000 fighter jets to Taipei. The former sale led to the massive Lafayette Corruption Scandal or *Affaire Dumas*. Not only had Taiwanese and French officials received kickbacks, the silence of Chinese government officials had also been bought.<sup>40</sup>

More bribes to Chinese officials were not as effective to quell outrage over the later Mirage sales. France's consulate in Guangzhou was closed and French businesses were affected. An envoy of Prime Minister Balladur was required to patch up relations again, which ended in a new joint statement in January 1994.<sup>41</sup> Now, France's position had moved the closest to Beijing of all countries in non-communist Europe except Portugal.

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<sup>32</sup> Maximilian Graf, Wolfgang Mueller, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

<sup>33</sup> Vincent K.L. Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 415.

<sup>34</sup> Nationaal Archief 2.05.166/655, Codebericht van 9 mei 1972.

<sup>35</sup> J. Colijn, P. Rusman, *Wapenleveranties – II: De Leverantie van Twee Onderzeeboten Aan Taiwan*, Instituut voor Internationale Studiën, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 1984.

<sup>36</sup> Mari Saito, Yimou Lee, Ju-Min Park, Tim Kelly, Andrew Macaskill, Sarah Wu, David Lague, "Taiwan's Friends Aid Stealthy Submarine Project as China Threat Rises", *Reuters*, 29 November 2021.

<sup>37</sup> Ingrid D'Hooghe, "The 1991/1992 Dutch Debate On the Sale of Submarines To Taiwan", *China Information*, vol. 6, n° 4, pp. 40-54, 1992.

<sup>38</sup> "Nederland En Duitsland: Geen Duikboten Taiwan", *Trouw*, 26 April 2001.

<sup>39</sup> Gunter Schubert, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>40</sup> Sung Hung En, "Transnational Corruption in Weapons Procurement in East Asia: A Case Analysis", *Sociological Focus*, vol. 42, n° 3, 2009, pp. 254-275.

<sup>41</sup> Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "France's Taiwan Policy: A Case of Shopkeeper Diplomacy", *CERI-SciencesPo*, Paris, 2001.

Paris promised not to sell major weapons to Taiwan. It “confirmed” that it recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China, and Taiwan as an inseparable part of China (France 1994). This has, however, not prevented the sale of parts and munitions for the two weapon systems, France saying it is “implementing existing deals”.<sup>42</sup>

## 2.4 Fourth wave

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France’s “correction” of the record came just as Central and Eastern European countries were establishing their newly independent foreign policies after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This would set many of them on the road to EU and NATO membership, moving away from alignment with the camp more inclined towards China’s positions.

Pre-empting that shift, China’s Foreign ministry sent envoys to re-establish ties under the new regimes.<sup>43</sup> Beijing used the opportunity of rising enthusiasm for rapidly developing China and the lack of awareness of Taiwan – itself mired in its own post-Cold War democratization struggles. State visits re-establishing ties after a few years of neglect served as reasons to put out signed declarations.<sup>44</sup>

Countries that already had full diplomatic ties with Beijing since the PRC’s founding now made further public commitments to One China. Bulgaria (1998), Poland (1997), Romania (1997), Hungary (2000), and Slovakia (2003) all used similar language. They recognized that there is One China, the PRC as its sole legal government, and Taiwan as an inseparable part. The exception was Czechia (1999), which only conceded on the claim that Taiwan is part of China.

Former Yugoslavian Croatia (1992) and Slovenia as well as the three Baltic countries had to start from scratch, having just regained their independence. In identical language, Estonia (1991), Latvia (1991), and Lithuania (1991) adopted two of China’s claims: that the PRC is the sole legal government of China, and that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. There was a short hiccup, when Latvia allowed Taiwan to open a Consulate of the Republic of China in 1992, but it was forced to turn into a regular Taipei representative office following an agreement between Riga and Beijing in 1994.<sup>45</sup>

## 2.5 Fifth wave

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The last major wave resulted from a Chinese diplomatic campaign in response to the government of Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan (2000-2008). Chen was the first president of the pro-Taiwanese DPP and had made many promises to indigenize his country and move away from the ROC framework. He won in 2000 only because the vote had been split in three and he had no majority in the legislature.

With an inability to get meaningful legislation passed, facing a difficult re-election in 2004, and with no hope of establishing dialogue with China anyway, Chen used rhetoric and referenda to appeal to his Taiwanese nationalist base. Beijing’s response, in part, consisted of getting countries around the world to join China in opposition to Taipei’s actions. A series of signed declarations and statements with European capitals that gave in followed, moving their One China Policies closer to Beijing’s position again.

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<sup>42</sup> Reuters and AFP, “Focus on Covid-19, France Tells China after Taiwan Arms Deal Threat”, *France 24*, 13 May 2020.

<sup>43</sup> “China Developed Bilateral Relations with the East European Countries after Drastic Social Change in Them”, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC* (accessed 14 October 2024).

<sup>44</sup> Dominik Mierzejewski, “Between Central and Local Interdependence: Dimensions of Poland’s Relations with China” in Weiqing Song (ed.),

*China’s Relations with Central and Eastern Europe: From ‘Old Comrades’ to New Partners*, Routledge, London, 2017, p. 157.

<sup>45</sup> Justīne Kante, “Latvia and China: Entering the Post-Optimism Period”, in Māris Andžāns, Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova (ed.), *China in the Baltic States: From a Cause of Hope to Anxiety*, Rīga Stradiņš University, 2022, pp. 33-35.

## 3. Punishment and reward

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We are now in the sixth wave of what, for the first time, can be called *European* policies towards China *and* Taiwan. Just as Taiwan and its semiconductors have become more important to the EU in economic terms, so have European capitals begun to realize the geopolitical stakes as a more aggressive Beijing prepares the means for annexation.

There is a renewed campaign from Beijing to push its claims even further. It seeks to create the impression that there is an international consensus around its One China Principle, with help of countries outside the West eager to play along. As part of this campaign, it has worked tirelessly within the UN bureaucracy and around the world to retroactively change the meaning of the UNGA Resolution 2758.

Within Europe, though, the substantial increase of member states' interactions with Taiwan demonstrates that the promises made in the Joint Declarations are only one part of their One China Policies. These allow for some flexibility. China enforces boundaries on Taiwan-related actions through incentives and punishments, from diplomatic statements to military exercises. This section will examine past examples to assess the value of using this flexibility, focusing on both symbolic gestures and technical cooperation.

### 3.1 Symbolic and political actions

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China's sensitivity to symbolic actions concerning Taiwan is high. EU member states need to act with awareness of potential repercussions, whether through words, visits, or official engagements.

**Names.** Terminology matters a great deal to Beijing, as demonstrated by its efforts to have the UN and ISO use "Taiwan, Province of China". Naming Taiwan-related offices is therefore sensitive: Lithuania faced sanctions for permitting a "Taiwan" office name in 2021, rather than the usual "Taipei", causing repercussions that even affected the integrity of the Common Market, requiring EU intervention.<sup>46</sup> The Netherlands, on the other hand, successfully renamed its representation in 2020 from Netherlands Trade and Investment Office to "Netherlands Office Taipei", signaling closer ties with minimal fallout.<sup>47</sup>

**Visits.** Visits by European officials can strengthen ties with Taiwan if managed carefully. While high-profile visits, such as former Speaker Nancy Pelosi's 2022 trip to Taiwan, can be followed by military responses from China, lower-key ministerial or political exchanges tend to elicit limited pushback. Recent visits by Germany's Education and Justice ministers and European legislators have allowed meaningful exchanges without major consequences. Regular, low-profile exchanges at the working level, such as the EU-Taiwan "Dialogue on Digital Economy" led by the EU Commission DG CONNECT, are also increasing, fostering normalization and reducing Taiwan's diplomatic isolation.

**Political acts.** Statements and political initiatives involving Taiwan often provoke a response from Beijing due to their symbolic visibility. Public acts by political leaders help support lower officials strengthen substantive ties and defend the space allowed by One China Policies. Extreme actions, like calls for Taiwan's formal independence, however,

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<sup>46</sup> "EU Requests Two WTO Panels against China: Trade Restrictions on Lithuania and High-Tech Patents", [European Commission](#), 7 December 2021.

<sup>47</sup> "Statement on the Netherlands Trade and Investment Office's Name Change", [Ministry of Foreign Affairs](#), Government of the Netherlands, 28 April 2020.

risk unnecessary diplomatic turbulence and run counter to the broad support of Taiwan's population for maintaining the *status quo*.<sup>48</sup>

Constructive moves include parliamentary motions that support Taiwan's participation in international organizations or oppose Beijing's attempts to reinterpret UNGA Resolution 2758, as seen with recent discussions in the Dutch parliament.<sup>49</sup> Necessary diplomatic actions, such as condemning Chinese military exercises around Taiwan and conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the Taiwan Strait, counter Chinese attempts to change customary international law while supporting both Taiwan's stability and Europe's interests in the region.

## 3.2 Economic and technical cooperation

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European countries recognize that cooperation with Taiwan, a significant economic partner, is essential, even though official diplomatic ties with Taipei remain impossible. While some capitals refrain from high-level engagement, there is ample space for practical collaboration that supports European interests.

**Trade.** Full trade or investment agreements are unlikely at present, given the reluctance of Brussels. Targeted sectoral agreements – built on existing dialogues such as those in the digital economy or semiconductor cooperation between Central and Eastern Europe and Taiwan<sup>50</sup> – offer pragmatic ways to strengthen ties at a lower symbolic cost.

**Justice.** Meaningful cooperation can occur in judicial and home affairs, especially to support Taiwanese citizens' mobility and legal rights within Europe. For example, Taiwanese passport holders already travel visa-free within the Schengen Zone. Issues persist, however, such as the extradition of Taiwanese suspects to China by Spain<sup>51</sup> and the classification of Taiwanese nationals as Chinese in Denmark.<sup>52</sup> Addressing these discrepancies would help facilitate Taiwanese engagement in business and tourism across Europe while respecting the complex political landscape.

**Security.** In the sensitive area of security, collaboration remains mostly under the radar. Nonetheless, European intelligence and law enforcement are increasingly interested in Taiwan's expertise in countering Chinese cyberattacks and disinformation, given similar concerns arising from Russian aggression in Europe. In military matters, European companies have discreetly supported Taiwan's indigenous defense capabilities as suppliers, with France continuing to fulfil arms contracts from past agreements.

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<sup>48</sup> "Changes in the Unification – Independence Stances of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by Election Study Center, NCCU (1994-2024.06)", [Election Study Center](#), National Chenchi University, 8 July 2024.

<sup>49</sup> Fang Wei-li, Chen Cheng-yu, Esme Yeh, "MOFA thanks Dutch House for support", [Taipei Times](#), 14 September 2024.

<sup>50</sup> Chang Ai, Evelyn Kao, "Latvia-Lithuania-Taiwan Tech Cooperation Conference Held in Taipei", [Focus Taiwan](#), 10 August 2024.

<sup>51</sup> "China's Hunt for Taiwanese Overseas: The PRC's Use of Extradition and Deportation to Undermine Taiwanese Sovereignty", [Safeguard Defenders](#), Madrid, 2021.

<sup>52</sup> Michael Danielsen, "Does Denmark Consider Taiwan a Part of China? Should Taiwan's Democracy Be Subordinated to China?", [Taiwan Corner](#), 23 October 2024.

**Table 2. Action and consequence**

	<b>DAMAGING</b>	<b>COSTLY</b>	<b>CONSTRUCTIVE</b>	<b>NECESSARY</b>	
<b>SYMBOLIC AND POLITICAL ACTS</b>	<b>NAMES</b>	Saying “Republic of Taiwan” or “West Taiwan”: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incorrect and unserious.</li> <li>• Triggers negative and confused responses.</li> </ul>	Lithuania opening representative office in name of “Taiwan”: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Describes reality.</li> <li>• Reprisals from China affected EU Common Market.</li> </ul>	Netherlands renaming Netherlands Trade and Investment Office to Netherlands Office Taipei: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reflects growing ties.</li> <li>• Limited response from China.</li> </ul>	Not going along with One China Principle: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defend own policy.</li> <li>• Avoid creating precedents.</li> </ul>
	<b>VISITS</b>	State visits to Taiwan by big European country: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exceed unofficial relationship.</li> <li>• Will end ties with PRC and lead to punishment.</li> </ul>	Visit by Speaker Nancy Pelosi: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Powerful signal of commitment and claim to right to visit.</li> <li>• Substantial increase in tension, large-scale military exercises.</li> </ul>	Lower-key political exchanges: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Keep open channels and familiarity between politicians.</li> <li>• Limited response from China.</li> </ul>	Exchanges like cyber dialogue: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unavoidable cooperation with important partner.</li> <li>• No response from China.</li> </ul>
	<b>POLITICAL</b>	Recognizing Taiwanese independence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No consensus in Taiwan.</li> <li>• Harsh reprisals from China.</li> </ul>	Parliamentary motions of support: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Give cover to ministers and civil servants.</li> <li>• Limited response from China.</li> </ul>	Parliamentary motions of support: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Give cover to ministers and civil servants.</li> <li>• Limited response from China.</li> </ul>	Condemnations and FONOPs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prevent Beijing changing customary international law.</li> <li>• Limited response from China.</li> </ul>
<b>ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION</b>	<b>TRADE</b>	–	Parliamentary motions of support: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Powerful symbol and assertion of WTO rights.</li> <li>• Limited trade gains in return for stiff Chinese political costs.</li> </ul>	Parliamentary motions of support: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Practical progress in key areas.</li> <li>• Limited response from China.</li> </ul>	Dialogue with DG TRADE: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unavoidable cooperation with important partner.</li> <li>• No response from China.</li> </ul>
	<b>JUSTICE</b>	Pushing for Interpol membership: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incredibly sensitive for China.</li> <li>• Strong reprisals from China, low likelihood of success.</li> </ul>	Open cooperation between law enforcement services: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Important practical benefits.</li> <li>• Strong Chinese response.</li> </ul>	Visa-free travel for Taiwanese: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Important practical step.</li> <li>• No response from China.</li> </ul>	Registration of Taiwanese as ROC nationals: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Avoid extradition or other incorrect measures.</li> <li>• Limited response from China.</li> </ul>
	<b>SECURITY</b>	Military alliance with Taiwan: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not credible or practical.</li> <li>• Risks triggering Chinese military response.</li> </ul>	Weapons sale to Taiwan: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support Taiwanese self-defense and deterrence.</li> <li>• Heavy diplomatic price.</li> </ul>	Continued low-key suppliers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Help Taiwan defend itself.</li> <li>• Limited response from China.</li> </ul>	Exchanges of information and experiences: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unavoidable cooperation with important partner.</li> <li>• Limited response from China.</li> </ul>

## 4. Looking ahead

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“One China” is a living and breathing concept, not just for China, but also for Europe. From Paris getting away with basically not adopting any One China Policy in 1964 to thoughtless concessions by European countries at the start of this century, China has until recently had the initiative. Beijing succeeded in gradually gaining ground, moving countries around the world as well as institutions closer to its conception. Only in recent years has this reversed, as countries are warier of Beijing and more aware of Taipei.

The history of European relations with Taiwan demonstrates clear tension. On the one side is the power and pull of a resurgent China. On the other side are European countries’ interests in Taiwan. These interests are not just about the obvious economic and political importance of the 21st economy of the world. Taiwan’s unique position in East Asia as a free and democratic country strategically located at the heart of the first island chain<sup>53</sup> means that Chinese nationalist dreams of unification also affect the EU.

Each European country has had to strike a balance, reflected in its own One China policy. The overview in this report shows that logically the balances struck differ. Interaction with Taiwan comes at a price. This price depends not only on exposure to China but also on the country’s symbolic weight in Beijing’s eyes. Each EU member state weighs its interests and values differently.

Taiwan will show up more often in EU deliberations in the future. Pressure to adopt a position will grow, not just from Xi Jinping’s China or Donald Trump’s America, but also from the practical reality of international relations. The variety of One China Policies in Europe has advantages because of the flexibility it offers. However, the disadvantages are growing.

The most high-profile case in recent years was Lithuania’s decision to accept a Taiwanese representative office under the name of “Taiwan”. The resulting turbulence affected the whole of the EU, even though it had not been involved in the decision-making. On the other side, Cyprus blocks all mention of Taiwan at EU meetings over fears of giving Turkey’s claims to its north legitimacy because a Turkish minister once mentioned a “Taiwan model” in 2011.<sup>54</sup>

Complete unification of the many policies of EU member states is impossible and undesirable. However, some degree of convergence is necessary. Firstly, it should be possible to discuss Taiwan and engage in substantive interactions. Secondly, in return, member states’ actions and statements should stay within the bandwidth of constructive actions as outlined in Table 2. Of the actions listed in this table, EU member states should all pursue the necessary ones while as a minimum letting others engage in the constructive options even if they themselves chose not to. The decision to engage in costly actions should be taken in concert, weighing if the political costs can be carried long-term. Da-maging actions should be avoided.

This way, important interaction with Taiwan can go ahead while EU states can expect support from their fellow member states if legitimate actions trigger a Chinese response.

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<sup>53</sup> Hugo Tierny, “Opportunité ou vulnérabilité ? Regards chinois sur l’importance géostratégique de Taiwan”, [Programme Taiwan sur la sécurité et la diplomatie](#), Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, 22 November 2021.

<sup>54</sup> Finbarr Bermingham, “Taiwan Election 2024: Silence in Brussels Lays Bare EU Divisions on Taipei”, [South China Morning Post](#), 12 January 2024.

## Appendix 1. Six waves of EU member states' One China Policies

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### FIRST WAVE

- Facing the CCP victory in the Chinese Civil War.
- Soviet bloc (1949): Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania
  - No statements.
  - Support for Beijing in the United Nations.
- Nordic/neutral states (1950): Denmark, Finland, Sweden
  - No statements.
- Partial success: The Netherlands (1950) “de jure” recognition.

### SECOND WAVE

- Facing the PRC takeover of the China seat in the UN under UNGA Resolution 2758.
- Special cases: France (1964) and West Germany (1972)
  - Single-line statements.
  - No written commitment to One China.
- Western European wave
  - Neutral/small states: Austria (1971), Cyprus (1971), Luxembourg (1972), and Ireland (1979)
    - Recognize PRC as sole legal government of China.
    - No mention of Taiwan.
  - Larger states: Italy (1970), Belgium (1971), Greece (1972), Malta (1972), the Netherlands (1972), Spain (1972), and Portugal (1979)
    - Recognize PRC as sole legal government of China.
    - Take note of/respect/recognize China’s position on Taiwan.

### THIRD WAVE

- Facing the consequences of military sales to Taiwan.
- Netherlands (1984):
  - Promise to not sell weapons to Taiwan anymore.
- France (1994):
  - Promise to not sell major weapons to Taiwan anymore.
  - Recognize PRC as sole legal government of China.
  - Recognize that Taiwan is inseparable part of China.

### FOURTH WAVE

- Facing the renewed autonomy and sovereignty of Central and Eastern European countries after the end of the Cold War.
- State visit declarations with existing diplomatic partners: Poland (1997), Romania (1997), Bulgaria (1998), Czechia (1999), Hungary (2000), and Slovakia (2003).
  - Recognize One China, the PRC as the sole legal government, that there is One China, and that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China.
  - Czechia only concedes on the claim that Taiwan is part of China.
  - Apart from Czechia and Poland, the remaining four also recognize a new claim, the explicit promise not to engage in formal relations with Taiwan.
- New joint declarations with restored countries: Estonia (1991), Latvia (1991), and Lithuania (1991), Croatia (1992), Slovenia (1992, 1996).



- Recognize that the PRC is the sole legal government of China.
- That Taiwan is an inseparable part of China.
- That they will not have official relations with Taiwan.

#### FIFTH WAVE

- Facing a Chinese diplomatic campaign in response to Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian.
  - Explicit opposition to “Taiwanese independence”: Germany (2004), Romania (2004), Croatia (2005), Greece (2006).
  - Explicit support for “peaceful unification”: Germany (2004), Poland (2004), Croatia (2005), Bulgaria (2006), Ireland (2012).
  - Explicit claim of opposition to Taiwan’s membership of international organizations requiring sovereignty, by Romania (2003, 2004), Denmark (2008), Ireland (2012).
  - Opposition to actions aggravating tension in the Taiwan Strait by Germany (2004), Italy (2004), Poland (2004), Portugal (2005), and Czechia (2006).
  - Commitment or inaccurate “reaffirmation” of indeterminate nature to Beijing’s own One China *Principle* by Romania (2003, 2004), Italy (2004), Spain (2005), and Portugal (2018).

#### SIXTH WAVE

- Facing an assertive China under Xi Jinping.

## Appendix 2. Declarations and statements

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This appendix contains a list of relevant Declarations and Statements between China and EU member states. The relevant phrases concerning Taiwan have been quoted in Mandarin and translated by the author.

### AUSTRIA

**1971:** "Joint Communiqué of the Government of the PRC and the Government of the Republic of Austria on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Austria" 中华人民共和国政府和奥地利共和国政府关于中、奥两国建立外交关系的联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, November 7, 2000.

Mandarin: "奥地利政府承认中华人民共和国政府为中国唯一合法政府"

Translation: "*The government of Austria recognizes the government of the PRC as the only legal government of China.*"

### BELGIUM

**1971:** "Joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Kingdom of Belgium" 中华人民共和国和比利时王国建立外交关系的联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, November 7, 2000.

Mandarin: "中国政府重申：台湾是中华人民共和国领土不可分割的一部分。比利时政府注意到中国政府的这一声明。比利时政府承认中华人民共和国政府为中国的唯一合法政府"

Translation: "*The Chinese government reaffirms: Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of the PRC. The government of Belgium takes note of this statement of the Chinese government. The government of Belgium recognizes the government of the PRC as the only legal government of China.*"

### BULGARIA

**1998:** "Joint Declaration of the PRC and the Republic of Bulgaria" 中华人民共和国和保加利亚共和国联合声明, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, November 7, 2000.

Mandarin: "保方重申世界上只有一个中国，台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，中华人民共和国政府是代表全中国人民的唯一合法政府的原则立场。保加利布不与台湾建立官方联系和接触"

Translation: "*The Bulgarian side reaffirms the principled position that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China, and the government of the PRC is the only legal government representing the whole Chinese people. Bulgaria does not establish official contacts and engagements with Taiwan.*"

**2006:** "Joint Declaration of the Government of the PRC and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria" 中华人民共和国政府和保加利亚共和国政府联合声明, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, April 9, 2007.

Mandarin: "保方重申，坚持奉行一个中国的原则立场，即：承认中华人民共和国政府是代表全中国的唯一合法政府，台湾是中国不可分割的一部分。保方不与台湾进行任何形式的官方往来，支持中华人民共和国政府通过和平方式实现国家统一的努力"

Translation: "*The Bulgarian side reaffirms it upholds pursuing the principled position of One China, and recognizes that the government of the PRC is the only legal government representing the whole of China, and that Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China. The Bulgarian side does not engage in any form of official contact with Taiwan and supports the efforts of the government of the PRC achieving national unification through a peaceful way.*"

## CROATIA

**1992:** "Joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Republic of Croatia" 中华人民共和国和克罗地亚共和国建交联合公报, PRC Treaty Database, 1992.

Mandarin: "克罗地亚共和国政府承认中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府·台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分·克罗地亚共和国政府确认不和台湾建立官方关系"

Translation: "*The government of the Republic of Croatia recognizes the government of the PRC as the only legal government of China and that Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China. The government of the Republic of Croatia confirms not to establish official contacts with Taiwan.*"

**2005:** "Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Partnership between the PRC and the Republic of Croatia" 中华人民共和国和克罗地亚共和国关于建立全面合作伙伴关系的联合声明, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, May 26, 2005.

Mandarin: "克罗地亚共和国在任何情况下都将一如既往地支持一个中国政策及其所涵盖的所有相关立场·认为台湾问题的解决是中华人民共和国的内部事务·反对“台湾独立”·支持中国的和平统一"

Translation: "*The Republic of Croatia will under any circumstances just as before support the One China Policy and all relevant positions covered by it, recognize the solution to the Taiwan question is the internal affairs of the PRC, and opposes 'Taiwanese independence' and supports the peaceful unification of China.*"

## CYPRUS

**1971:** "Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Republic of Cyprus" 关于中华人民共和国和塞浦路斯共和国建立外交关系的公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, November 7, 2000.

Mandarin: "塞浦路斯共和国政府承认中华人民共和国政府是代表全中国人民的唯一合法政府"

Translation: "*The government of the Republic of Cyprus recognizes the government of the PRC is the only legal government representing the whole Chinese people.*"

## CZECHIA

**1999:** "Joint Communiqué of the Government of the PRC and the Government of the Czech Republic" 中华人民共和国政府与捷克共和国政府联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, November 7, 2000.

Mandarin: "捷方重申在一个中国的原则基础上尊重中华人民共和国的主权和领土完整·承认台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分"

Translation: "*The Czech side reaffirms that on the principled basis of One China it respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the PRC and recognizes that Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China.*"

## DENMARK

**2008:** "Joint Declaration of the Government of the PRC and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark on the Establishment of an All-round Strategic Partnership (Full Text)" 中华人民共和国政府和丹麦王国政府关于建立全面战略伙伴关系的联合声明(全文), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, October 25, 2008.

Mandarin: "丹麦重申坚定奉行一个中国政策·不支持台湾加入仅限主权国家参加的国际组织·不与台湾进行官方往来·.....丹方表达了希望通过建设性对话和平解决台湾问题的愿望"

Translation: "*Denmark reaffirms it firmly pursues the One China Policy, does not support Taiwan joining international organizations limited to participation by sovereign states and does not conduct official dealings with Taiwan. [...] The Danish side expresses its desires that the Taiwan question is solved peacefully through constructive dialogue.*"

## ESTONIA

**1991:** "Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the PRC and the Republic of Estonia" 中华人民共和国和爱沙尼亚共和国建交联合公报, [PRC Treaty Database](#), September 11, 1991.

Mandarin: "爱沙尼亚共和国政府承认中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府·台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分。爱沙尼亚共和国政府承诺不和台湾建立任何形式的正式的、官方的关系"

Translation: "*The government of the Republic of Estonia recognizes that the government of the PRC is the only legal government of China and Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China. The government of the Republic of Estonia promises not to establish any form of formal or official relations with Taiwan.*"

## EUROPEAN UNION

Hong Kong AFP, "Soames Holds Press Conference, Meets Chou En-Lai, Hosts Banquet", *FBIS Daily Report: PRC 1 (91): A19*, 1975.

Christopher Soames, "Speech by Sir Christopher Soames, Vice-President of the Commission, during a European Parliament Debate on China. Strasbourg, 18 June 1975", [Archive of European Integration](#), University of Pittsburgh, June 18, 1975.

## FINLAND

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## FRANCE

**1964:** "Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between France and China" 中法建交公报, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China](#), January 27, 1964.

Mandarin: –

**1994:** "Joint communiqué of the Government of the PRC and the Government of the French Republic" 中华人民共和国政府和法兰西共和国政府联合公报, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC](#), January 12, 1994.

Mandarin: "法国方面确认·法国政府承认中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府·台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分。.....·法国政府承诺今后不批准法国企业参与武装台湾"

Translation: "*The French side confirms, the government of France recognizes that the government of the PRC is the only legal government of China and Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China. [...] the government of France [does] not to authorize the participation of French companies in arming Taiwan henceforth.*"

## GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC)

**1972:** "Joint Communiqué of the Government of the PRC and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Two Countries" 中华人民共和国政府和德意志联邦共和国政府关于两国建立外交关系的联合公报, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC](#), November 7, 2000.

Mandarin: –

**2004:** "Sino-German Joint Statement on Premier Wen Jiabao's Visit to Germany" 中德关于温家宝总理访德的联合声明, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC](#), April 3, 2008.

Mandarin: "德国政府承诺坚持明确的一个中国的政策·支持中国和平统一。德国政府反对"台湾独立"·并反对旨在加剧台湾海峡紧张局势的任何举动"

Translation: "The government of Germany promises to uphold a clear One China Policy and support the peaceful unification of China. The government of Germany opposes 'Taiwanese independence' and opposes any action aimed at aggravating the tense situation in the Strait of Taiwan."

2008: "Chronology 2008 Jan.~ 2008 Jun.", Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan).

Citation: "In a meeting in with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Berlin, China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi states that Germany will continue to follow the 'One China' policy resolutely, recognize that Taiwan and Tibet are part of the Chinese territory, firmly oppose Taiwan's 'referendum on joining the United Nations' [...]"

## GREECE

1972: "Joint Communiqué between the PRC and the Kingdom of Greece on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations" 中华人民共和国和希腊王国关于建立外交关系的联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, March 12, 2002.

Mandarin: "中国政府重申：台湾是中华人民共和国领土不可分割的一部分。希腊政府注意到中国政府的这一立场"

Translation: "The government of China reaffirms: Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of the PRC. The government of Greece takes note of this position of the government of China."

2006: "Joint Declaration of the PRC and the Hellenic Republic on the Establishment of a Global Strategic Partnership" 中华人民共和国和希腊共和国关于建立全面战略伙伴关系的联合声明, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, January 19, 2006.

Mandarin: "希腊政府重申，将继续恪守一个中国原则，反对“台独”，希望台湾问题得到和平解决"

Translation: "The government of Greece reaffirms, it will continue to strictly observe the One China Principle, opposes 'Taiwanese independence', and hopes the Taiwan question will be peacefully resolved."

## HUNGARY

2000: "Joint Declaration of the Government of the PRC and the Government of the Republic of Hungary" 中华人民共和国政府与匈牙利共和国政府联合声明, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, December 7, 2000.

Mandarin: "匈牙利共和国政府重申尊重中国的主权与领土完整并坚持一个中国的原则，即世界上只有一个中国，台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府。匈牙利不与台湾进行官方接触，与台湾只在非官方、非政府间的范围内进行私人性质的经济、文化交流"

Translation: "The government of the Republic of Hungary reaffirms it respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and upholds the One China Principle, namely there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China, and the government of the PRC is the only legal government of China. Hungary does not engage in official contact with Taiwan, economic and cultural exchanges of private nature with Taiwan only take place in unofficial or non-governmental context."

## IRELAND

1979: "Joint Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Ireland" 中华人民共和国和爱尔兰建立外交关系的联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, November 7, 2000.

Mandarin: "爱尔兰政府承认中华人民共和国政府为中国的唯一合法政府"

Translation: "The government of Ireland recognizes the government of the PRC as the only legal government of China."

**2012:** "Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Mutually Beneficial Strategic Partnership between the PRC and Ireland" 中华人民共和国和爱尔兰关于建立互惠战略伙伴关系的联合声明, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC](#), March 28, 2012.

Mandarin: "爱方重申·将继续坚定不移地奉行一个中国政策·反对任何损害中国领土完整的言论和主张·不支持台湾加入仅限主权国家参加的国际组织·支持两岸关系和平发展·支持中国实现和平统一大业"

Translation: "*The Irish side reaffirms, it will unswervingly pursue the One China Policy, opposes any word or position harming the territorial integrity of China, does not support Taiwan joining international organizations limited to participation by sovereign states, supports the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and supports China achieving the great cause of national unification.*"

## ITALY

**1970:** "Joint Communiqué of the Government of the PRC and the Government of the Republic of Italy on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Italy" 中华人民共和国政府和意大利共和国政府关于中、意两国建立外交关系的联合公报, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC](#), March 12, 2002.

Mandarin: "中国政府重申：台湾是中华人民共和国领土不可分割的一部分。意大利政府注意到中国政府的这一声明。意大利政府承认中华人民共和国政府为中国的唯一合法政府"

Translation: "*The government of China reaffirms: Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of the PRC. The government of Italy takes note of this statement of the government of China. The government of Italy recognizes the government of the PRC as the only legal government of China.*"

**2004:** "Joint Communiqué of the Government of the PRC and the Government of the Italian Republic" 中华人民共和国政府和意大利共和国政府联合公报, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC](#), May 6, 2004.

Mandarin: "意大利政府重申坚定奉行一个中国政策·并表示反对旨在改变台湾地位和加剧台海两岸紧张局势的任何行动"

Translation: "*The government of Italy reaffirms it firmly pursues the One China Policy and expresses opposition to any action aimed at aggravating the tense situation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.*"

## LATVIA

**1991:** "Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the PRC and the Republic of Latvia" 中华人民共和国和拉脱维亚共和国建交联合公报, [PRC Treaty Database](#), September 12, 1991.

Mandarin: "拉脱维亚共和国政府承认中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府·台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分。拉脱维亚共和国政府承诺不和台湾建立官方关系和进行官方往来"

Translation: "*The government of the Republic of Latvia recognizes that the government of the PRC is the only legal government of China and Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China. The government of the Republic of Latvia promises not to establish official relations or engage in official dealings with Taiwan.*"

## LITHUANIA

**1991:** "Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the PRC and the Republic of Lithuania" 中华人民共和国和立陶宛共和国建交联合公报, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC](#), November 7, 2000.

Mandarin: "立陶宛共和国政府承认中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府·台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分。立陶宛共和国政府承诺不和台湾建立官方关系和进行官方往来"

Translation: "The government of the Republic of Lithuania recognizes that the government of the PRC is the only legal government of China and Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China. The government of the Republic of Lithuania promises not to establish official relations or engage in official dealings with Taiwan."

## LUXEMBOURG

**1972:** "Joint Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg" 中华人民共和国和卢森堡大公国建立外交关系的联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, November 7, 2000.

Mandarin: "卢森堡大公国政府确认，它承认中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府"

Translation: "The government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg confirms that it recognizes the government of the PRC is the only legal government of China."

## MALTA

**1972:** "Joint Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Malta." 中华人民共和国和马尔他建立外交关系的联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, November 7, 2000.

Mandarin: "马耳他政府承认中华人民共和国政府为中国的唯一合法政府。中国政府重申：台湾省是中华人民共和国领土不可分割的一部分。马耳他政府注意到中国政府的这一声明"

Translation: "The government of Malta recognizes the government of the PRC as the only legal government of China. The government of China reaffirms: Taiwan Province is an inseparable part of the territory of the PRC. The government of Malta takes note of this statement of the government of China."

## THE NETHERLANDS

**1972:** "Joint Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Government of the PRC and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands" 中华人民共和国政府和荷兰王国政府建立外交关系的联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, May 16, 1972.

Mandarin: "中国政府重申台湾是中华人民共和国的一个省。荷兰王国政府尊重中国政府的这一立场，并重申它承认中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府"

Translation: "The government of China reaffirms that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. The government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands respects this position of the government of China and reaffirms it recognizes the government of the PRC is the only legal government of China."

## POLAND

**1997:** "Joint Communiqué of the PRC and the Republic of Poland" 中华人民共和国和波兰共和国联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, November 7, 2000.

Mandarin: "波兰共和国方面重申，波兰共和国承认世界上只有一个中国，即中华人民共和国，台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，中华人民共和国政府是代表全中国人民的唯一合法政府"

Translation: "The side of the Republic of Poland reaffirms, the Republic of Poland recognizes that there is only one China in the world, namely the PRC, Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China, and the government of the PRC is the only legal government representing the whole Chinese people."

**2004:** "Joint Declaration of the PRC and the Republic of Poland" 中华人民共和国和波兰共和国联合声明, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, June 8, 2004.

Mandarin: "波兰重申，坚持一个中国政策不变，反对任何旨在改变台湾地位、导致台海局势紧张的做法。支持中国和平统一"

Translate: "Poland reaffirms it unchangeably upholds the One China Policy, opposes any practice aimed at changing the position of Taiwan or leading to the aggravation of tension in the Taiwan Strait. It supports the peaceful unification of China."

## PORTUGAL

**1979:** "Joint Communiqué of the Government of the PRC and the Government of the Portuguese Republic on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Portugal" 中华人民共和国政府和葡萄牙共和国政府关于中葡两国建立外交关系的联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, March 12, 2002.

Mandarin: "葡萄牙共和国政府承认中华人民共和国政府为中国的唯一合法政府。台湾是中华人民共和国不可分割的一部分。葡萄牙共和国政府声明，早已自一九七五年一月起同台湾断绝外交关系"

Translation: "The government of the Republic of Portugal recognizes that the government of the PRC as the only legal government of China and Taiwan is an inseparable part of the PRC. The government of the Republic of Portugal states that as early as January 1975 it already broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan."

**2005:** "China and Portugal issued a joint press release (Full Text)" 中国和葡萄牙发表联合新闻公报(全文), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, January 13, 2005.

Mandarin: "葡萄牙重申支持一个中国的政策，反对旨在改变台湾地位、加剧台海紧张局势或可能导致台湾独立的任何单方面举动。葡方认为，应以建设性对话作为两岸关系的基础，和平解决台湾问题，以保证该地区的稳定、繁荣"

Translation: "Portugal reaffirms it supports the One China Policy, opposes any unilateral moves aimed at changing the position of Taiwan, aggravating the tense situation in the Taiwan Strait or maybe leading to Taiwanese independence. The Portuguese believes peacefully resolving the Taiwan question must be with constructive dialogue as the basis for cross-Strait Relations to guarantee that region's stability and prosperity."

**2018:** "Joint Declaration of the PRC and the Portuguese Republic on Further Strengthening the Overall Strategic Partnership (Full Text)" 中华人民共和国和葡萄牙共和国关于进一步加强全面战略伙伴关系的联合声明(全文), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, December 6, 2018.

Mandarin: "葡萄牙重申奉行一个中国原则，在台湾问题上支持中方立场"

Translation: "Portugal reaffirms that it pursues the One China Principle and supports the position of the Chinese side with regards to the Taiwan question."

## ROMANIA

**1997:** "Joint Communiqué of the PRC and Romania" 中华人民共和国和罗马尼亚联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, November 2000.

Mandarin: "罗方重申，罗马尼亚承认世界上只有一个中国，台湾是中国不可分割的一部分，中华人民共和国政府是代表全中国人民的唯一合法政府"

Translation: "The Romania side reaffirms, Romania recognizes that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, and the government of the PRC is the only legal government representing the whole Chinese people."

**2003:** "Joint Declaration of the PRC and Romania" 中华人民共和国与罗马尼亚联合声明, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, August 26, 2003.

Mandarin: "罗方重申，世界上只有一个中国，中华人民共和国政府是代表全中国的唯一合法政府，台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分。罗方将继续坚持一个中国的原则立场，不与台湾建立任何形式的官方关系和进行任何具有官方性质的往来，不支持台湾加入只有主权国家才能加入的国际组织"



Translation: "The Romanian side reaffirms, there is only one China in the world, the government of the PRC is the only legal government representing the whole of China, and Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China. The Romanian side continues upholding the principled position of One China, and does not establish any shape of official relations or engage in any dealings of official nature with Taiwan, and does not support Taiwan joining international organizations only sovereign states can join."

**2004:** "Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a Global Friendship and Partnership between the PRC and Romania" 中华人民共和国和罗马尼亚关于建立全面友好合作伙伴关系的联合声明, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, June 14, 2004.

Mandarin: "罗方重申将继续坚持一个中国的立场·承认世界上只有一个中国·中华人民共和国政府是代表全中国的惟一合法政府·台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分·罗方不同台湾建立任何形式的官方关系和进行任何具有官方性质的往来·不支持台湾加入只有主权国家才能加入的国际组织·反对“台湾独立”

Translation: "The Romanian side reaffirms it continues upholding the position of One China, recognizes there is only one China in the world, the government of the PRC is the only legal government representing the whole China, and Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China. The Romanian side does not establish any shape of official relations or engage in any dealings of official nature with Taiwan, does not support Taiwan joining international organizations only sovereign states can join, and opposes Taiwanese independence."

## SLOVAKIA

**2003:** "Joint Declaration of the PRC and the Slovak Republic" 中华人民共和国与斯洛伐克共和国联合声明, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, June 23, 2003.

Mandarin: "斯方重申·世界上只有一个中国·中华人民共和国政府是代表中国的唯一合法政府·台湾是中国不可分割的一部分;斯方将继续坚持一个中国原则·不同台湾建立任何形式的官方关系和进行任何形式的官方往来·斯洛伐克将只与台湾保持私营部门主导的贸易和经济关系"

Translation: "The Slovakian side reaffirms, there is only one China in the world, the government of the PRC is the only legal government representing China, Taiwan is an inseparable part of China; the Slovakian side continues upholding the One China Principle, does not establish any shape of official relations or engage in any dealings of official nature with Taiwan, Slovakia only maintains trade and economic relations with Taiwan under the guidance of the private sector."

## SLOVENIA

**1992:** "Joint Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Republic of Slovenia" 中华人民共和国和斯洛文尼亚共和国建交联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, March 14, 2002.

Mandarin: "斯洛文尼亚共和国政府承认中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府·台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分·斯洛文尼亚共和国政府确认不和台湾建立官方关系"

Translation: "The government of the Republic of Slovenia recognizes that the government of the PRC is the only legal government of China and Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China. The government of the Republic of Slovenia confirms it does not establish official relations with Taiwan."

**1996:** "Joint Communiqué of the PRC and the Republic of Slovenia" 中华人民共和国与斯洛文尼亚共和国联合公报, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, March 14, 2002.

Mandarin: "斯方重申将继续坚持“一个中国”的原则立场·承认世界上只有一个中国·台湾是中国不可分割的一部分·中华人民共和国政府是代表全中国人民的唯一合法政府·斯洛文尼亚共和国不和台湾进行任何官方往来和建立任何官方关系的立场不变"

Translation: "The Slovenian side reaffirms it continues to uphold the principled position of 'One China', recognizes that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, and the government of the PRC is the only legal government representing the whole Chinese People. The Republic

*of Slovenia's position of not engaging in any official dealings or establishing any official relations with Taiwan does not change."*

## SPAIN

**1973:** "Joint Communiqué of the Government of the PRC and the Government of the State of Spain on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Spain" 中华人民共和国政府和西班牙国政府关于中、西两国建立外交关系的联合公报, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC](#), March 12, 2002.

Mandarin: "西班牙国政府承认中华人民共和国政府为中国的唯一合法政府·承认中国政府关于台湾是中华人民共和国的一个省的立场·并决定在一九七三年四月十日前从台湾撤走其官方代表机构"

Translation: "The government of Spain recognizes the government of the PRC as the only legal government of China, recognizes the position of the government of China related to Taiwan being a province of the PRC, and decides to withdraw its official representative bodies from Taiwan before 10 April 1973."

**2005:** "Joint Communiqué of the PRC and the Kingdom of Spain (Full Text)" 中华人民共和国和西班牙王国发表联合公报 (全文), [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC](#), November 15, 2005.

Mandarin: "西班牙政府重申继续奉行一个中国原则·反对台湾采取任何违背一个中国原则的单边行动·支持两岸对话和交流·希望台湾问题得到和平解决"

Translation: "*The government of Spain reaffirms it continues to pursue the One China Principle, opposes Taiwan taking any unilateral action violating the One China Principle, supports cross-Strait dialogue and exchanges, and hopes the Taiwan question will be peacefully resolved.*"

## SWEDEN

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