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Palestinian Arab Protest in Israel today

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INTRODUCTION

The Arab citizens of Israel, or Israeli Arabs, represent 20% of the country's population and they define themselves as Palestinian. They demand a transformation of Israel into a democratic State for all its citizens that would provide Arabs with a "national minority" status. Their request to change the Jewish character of Israel combined with their solidarity with the Palestinian cause has fed far-right movements which accuse them of treason¹.

They are further stigmatised¹ now that they are represented by active political parties and civil society organisations that operate at the heart of the Israeli political system. Historically considered as strictly communitarian, their political activism has recently become part of a broader social movement that condemns Israeli politics' shift to the right and the gagging of opposition forces (associations, media etc...). This ideological realignment that began in the early 2000's was reinforced following the March 2015 elections that led to the formation of the most right-wing government in the history of Israel. It also led to the normalisation of ultranationalist and pro-settler narratives that have never considered Arab citizens as anything but a domestic threat that expresses strong opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian State. According to Ayelet Shaked, the Minister of Justice: "The State should say that there is place to maintain the Jewish majority even if it violates rights"². She also claimed that: "The Palestinian people have declared war on us, and we must respond with war. It is not a war against terror, and not a war against extremists. This is a war between two people. Who is the enemy?"

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¹ According to the 'Arab-Jewish Relations Index' released by the University of Haifa in 2017, 44,6% of Arab respondents recognised Israel as a State with a Jewish majority, compared to 60,3% in 2015. 49,7% accepted Hebrew as the dominant language, compared to 63,4% in 2015. The proportion of Jewish citizens who recognized the Arabs' right to live in Israel as a minority with full civil rights fell from 79,7% in 2015 to 73,8% in 2017. A decline was also found from 57,5% to 51,6% in the proportion of Jews willing to let Arab children study at the schools their children attend. <https://www.haifa.ac.il/index.php/en/home-page3/2934-arab-jewish-relations-index-directed-by-prof-sammy-smoocha-of-the-university-of-haifa-attitudes-of-jewish-and-arab-public-concerning-coexistence-deteriorate-but-foundation-of-relationships-is-still-firm>

² Revital Hotel, "Justice Minister: Israel Must Keep Jewish Majority Even at the Expense of Human Rights", *Haaretz*, 13 February 2018. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/justice-minister-israel-s-jewish-majority-trumps-than-human-rights-1.5811106>

The Palestinian people”³. For Naftali Bennett, leader of the Jewish Home and Minister of Education and of Diaspora Affairs: “The dream is that Judea and Samaria will be part of the sovereign State of Israel. We must act now and give our lives”⁴.

The place of Arab citizens in Israel must therefore be understood in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict’s stalemate that has exalted identity frustrations and the evolution of the Israeli political system which has disinhibited xenophobia and intolerance. The demonization of opposition voices—including those coming from the liberal Jewish community—and a tendency to team up with extreme right-wing figures⁵—some of them notoriously suspected of anti-Semitism⁶—have convinced some observers to label Israel as an “illiberal democracy”⁷ or an “ethnocracy”⁸.

In this context, the possibility for a change in the state of Arab Israelis is limited. They are constantly delegitimized by the conservative right wing politicians and sometimes even accused of terrorism. At the same time, the criminalisation of the legal opposition has led to the radicalisation of both formal and informal Arab mobilisation in Israel.

I – Palestinian Opposition inside the Israeli Political System

Although there has always been Arab Members of Parliament (MP) in the Knesset, Arab political groups gained autonomy in the 1980’s and subsequently became a structured and very active opposition actor. For the first time, Arab political parties submitted a joint list in the March 2015 elections and won thirteen seats (out of 120), two more than in 2013. Despite personal ambitions and significant differences between the communists (Jabha/Hadash), the nationalists (al Tajammu’/Balad, Ta’al), and the Islamists (Ra’am/United Arab List), they created an ad hoc coalition that agreed on two main

³ Ishaan Tharoor, “Israel’s New Justice Minister Considers all Palestinians to be the Enemy”, *The Washington Post*, 7 May 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/07/israels-new-justice-minister-considers-all-palestinians-to-be-the-enemy/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b3b70b343b7c

⁴ Barak Ravid, “Bennet: We Must Act Now and ‘Give Our Lives’ for the Annexation of the West Bank”, *Haaretz*, 6 October 2016. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/bennett-we-must-give-our-lives-for-annexation-of-w-bank-1.5447002>

⁵ Some Israeli politicians no longer refrain from meeting members of European far-right parties in the name of a common battle against radical Islam. Noa Landau, “Netanyahu Congratulates Hungary’s Orban After Landslide Reelection”, *Haaretz*, 9 April 2018. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/premium-netanyahu-congratulates-hungary-s-orban-after-reelection-1.5986011>

⁶ Like John Hagee and Robert Jeffress, two pastors of the far-right American evangelical community who attended the inauguration of the United States Embassy in Jerusalem on 14 May. These close supporters of President Donald Trump are known for having made anti-Semitic comments in the past.

⁷ Shlomo Ben-Ami (former Labor Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2000 to 2001), “Illiberal Israel”, Project Syndicate, 7 February 2017. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/illiberal-democracy-israel-netanyahu-by-shlomo-ben-ami-2017-02?barrier=accesspaylog>

⁸ Oren Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy. Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.

issues: the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and the transformation of Israel into a democratic State for all its citizens. This political agenda has been repeatedly condemned by Jewish deputies who have submitted requests to the Knesset Central Elections Committee to ensure that some Arab candidates become ineligible. Up until now, the High Court of Justice has always intervened to invalidate the decisions of the committee. Nevertheless, the vote on 19 July 2018 of the “Jewish Nation State” law defining Israel as a Jewish State is likely to exacerbate the radicalisation of Arab citizens’ and their feeling of segregation. It will also invalidate or even criminalise possible diverging definitions of the State of Israel. The Knesset Central Election Committee will finally have strong legal arguments to exclude Arab parties from the Parliamentary arena. In addition, this text has revised the 1992 basic law which defined Israel as a “Jewish and democratic State”. It has recognised Jerusalem as the “complete and united” capital of Israel, and has downgraded Arabic to a “special status” language whereas it was previously recognized as an official language with Hebrew. MP Ahmad Tibi (Ta’al party) said that the law was the « last nail in the coffin of the so-called Israeli democracy »⁹.

Since Arab MPs cannot influence parliamentary voting, they are increasingly opting for political contention with high media visibility. Following the example of Azmi Bishara (now exiled in Qatar), MP Tajammu’/Balad Haneen Zoabi was present on the Mavi Marmara flotilla in 2010, which led her to be prosecuted and threatened of ineligibility. The forty year-old feminist who graduated in journalism, a *passionaria* of the Palestinian cause, does not hesitate to qualify Israeli soldiers as “murderers”¹⁰ and to claim that “Here it’s my land. I am not a settler myself. I will stay in my house”¹¹. She welcomed Iran’s nuclear ambitions for “counterbalancing Israel’s power”¹² and said that Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “should be judged by the International Criminal Court at The Hague because he is a war criminal”¹³. Israel Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman replied: “You [Arab members of the United List] are all war criminals. You exploit the weaknesses and advantages of a democratic State to destroy us from the inside. You are here by mistake and the time will come when you will not be there anymore”. Violent diatribes between Jewish and Arab politicians are recurrent and have undeniably reached their peak during the last legislature.

⁹ « In response to the racist ‘nation law’... Tibi: ‘the land speaks Arabic’, AlQudsNews, 18 July 2018 (in Arabic). <http://alqudsnews.net/post/128597/>

¹⁰ Toi Staff, “Firebrand Arab MK handed week-long Knesset ban for calling soldiers ‘murderers’”, *The Times of Israel*, 14 March 2018. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/firebrand-arab-mk-handed-week-long-knesset-ban-for-calling-soldiers-murderers/>

¹¹ “Haneen Zoabi : Une députée arabe en Israël”, *The Huffington Post*, 27 février 2015. https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/02/27/israel-deputee-palestine_n_6767124.html

¹² Samuel Sokol, “New Balad MK Praises Iran’s Nuke Quest”, *Jerusalem Post*, March 31, 2009. <https://www.jpost.com/Israel/New-Balad-MK-praises-Irans-nuke-quest>

¹³ “Une députée arabe qualifie Netanyahu de criminel de guerre, Lieberman rétorque”, *i24NEWS*, 11 décembre 2017. <https://www.i24news.tv/fr/actu/israel/162455-171211-une-deputee-arabe-qualifie-netanyahou-de-criminel-de-guerre-lieberman-retorque>

More than ever, the thirteen Arab deputies are considered as a fifth column and a Trojan horse of the Palestinian struggle. In that regard, a law was voted in 2016 allowing 90 deputies (out of 120) to possibly expel their counterparts from Parliament. This measure was directly targeting the Arab MPs. In January 2018, they waved posters with the slogan "Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine" – in English and Arabic – during US Vice President Mike Pence's speech to the Knesset. The video of their expulsion has circulated on social media and received international media coverage¹⁴. The Israeli army's repression of demonstrations in Gaza in April-May 2018 during the "Great March of Return" also massively mobilised the Arab political leadership. Tajammu/Balad MP Jamal Zahalka called for a broad mobilisation campaign: "I want to see things expanding to the West Bank and inside Israel. Inside Israel there should be protests against the occupation and against the continuation of the siege and for a just peace. I hope Jews and Arabs will demonstrate. I even call for blocking roads in a non-violent way inside Israel. This is a legitimate means of protest"¹⁵. Ahmad Tibi likewise estimated that protests should continue and the "battle of conscience requires the development of a non-violent popular uprising".

2 – The Islamic Movement in the Margins of the Formal Political System

Despite their activism in the Knesset, Arab MPs only mobilise just over 60% of Arab voters in parliamentary elections (56% in 2013 and 63% in 2015). The rest of the population is abstaining, either by lack of interest, or because they support political forces which boycott national elections. The Islamic movement of Sheikh Ra'ed Salah (referred to as the "Northern Branch" since the 1996 split with the "Southern Branch" which participates in the Knesset elections) has long gathered a large part, albeit unquantifiable, of the extra-parliamentary Arab opposition. Concentrating its efforts on municipal representation in the 1990s, it turned in the 2000s into a somewhat nebulous religious and charitable association operating in all the Arab regions of the country. The movement has also chosen to concentrate its struggle on the holy Muslim sites in Jerusalem. The protection of al-Aqsa against any form of Israeli interference has become a unifying and mobilising argument, particularly in some Arab localities of the Triangle and in the Bedouin villages of the Negev.

¹⁴ Bénédicte Magnier, "Le discours de Mike Pence à la Knesset interrompu par des députés arabes israéliens", *The Huffington Post*, 22 janvier 2018. https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2018/01/22/le-discours-de-mike-pence-devant-le-parlement-israelien-interrompu-par-des-deputes-arabes-israeliens_a_23340057/

¹⁵ Ben Lynfield, "Joint List MK Calls on Arab Israelis to Show Solidarity with Gazans", *The Jerusalem Post*, April 8, 2018. <https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Joint-List-MK-calls-on-Arab-Israelis-to-show-solidarity-with-Gazans-549141>

Its capacity to mobilise was particularly visible in 2015 when hundreds of men and women sympathisers (called *murabitoun* and *murabibat*) originating from all Arab regions in Israel flocked into the Old City of Jerusalem to prevent Jews from having access to the Temple Mount. Violent protests led to the banning of *murabitoun* and *murabibat*, and then to that of the northern branch. Ra'ed Salah was arrested and accused of inciting violence and racism¹⁶. His organisation was accused, *inter alia*, of having links with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. The court decision, which limited its sources of funding and closed down its communication structures (such as "Sawt al-Haq wa al-Hurriya" newspaper and pls48.net website), has significantly affected the movement's actions. All associations (fifteen) which offered services as diverse as helping Palestinian orphans, education programs, the maintenance of Muslim property (mosques, cemeteries, etc.) and above all the defense of al-Aqsa, have been closed.

It took thirty years for the Israeli authorities to decide to ban this movement. This was after attempting to bureaucratize it (by forcing it to collaborate for imams' employment and municipalities' management) and after conducting close supervision of its activities by the domestic intelligence services (Shin Bet). The latter had opposed the ban so as not to increase its informal support and functioning¹⁷. The government, for its part, considered that the movement had become too popular, especially among Palestinian residents of Jerusalem who had great respect for the organisation led by the "1948 Palestinians", who were deemed able to revive the Palestinian struggle in Jerusalem.

In April 2016, a new party, "Trust and Reform" (al Wafaa wal Islah), was established in Nazareth to carry on political and charitable activities. Officially independent and not registered as a political party, the organisation is led by Husam Abu Leil, the former number three of the movement, native of Ayn Mahel near Nazareth. This "front structure" has faced financial difficulties but has continued to conduct social and charitable actions. For example, its members have conducted awareness campaigns on the issue of violence¹⁸ and armed gangs, as the circulation of illegal weapons has turned out to be a growing problem in the Arab Israeli community¹⁹. They also hold political meetings to discuss the reforms that need to be achieved in the Israeli Arab sector. They also hold rallies, such as the "Nakba Festival" in Arara last May²⁰, and the demonstration organised in Nazareth in March 2018 to condemn violence perpetrated by the Syrian

¹⁶ He was released on 17 January 2016 after nine months in detention, but was restricted from travel before being arrested again. Released in January 2017, he was jailed in August of the same year after further violence in Jerusalem.

¹⁷ Barak Ravid, "Behind the Scenes of Israel's Decision to Outlaw Islamic Movement's Northern Branch", *Haaretz*, 17 November 2015. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/premium-behind-the-scenes-of-islamic-movement-ban-1.5423139>

¹⁸ "Nazareth: Trust and Reform party distributes gifts to drivers to fight violence", *Kul al Arab*, 14 April 2018 (in Arabic) <http://www.alarab.com/Article/853748>

¹⁹ "The third general conference of the Trust and Reform party was held in Shefa 'Amr", *Kul alArab*, 21 April 2018 (in Arabic) <http://www.alarab.com/Article/854626>

²⁰ <http://www.alarab.com/Article/856987>

regime in Eastern Ghouta²¹. The party has also continued its mobilisation in favor of the Syrian revolution. In 2016, Ra'ed Salah published a post on his Facebook page criticising the misuse of Jerusalem (al-Quds in Arabic) by al-Quds force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Writing from his prison cell, he had publicly declared that Jerusalem should not be confused with "criminals who want to legitimise their crimes."

The movement still has mosques and preachers relaying the speeches of its leaders. The number two, Sheikh Kamal Khatib, is regularly interviewed by the police but is still free. He is however forbidden to travel to Jerusalem and abroad, but continues to speak publicly and preach at the Kafr Kanna Omar Ibn al Khattab mosque. In September 2017, he criticised Saudi Arabia's support for the victims of Hurricane Harvey in the United States and the lack of assistance to the persecuted Rohingya in Burma²². In May 2018, he mentioned the rumor that a senior Saudi official had visited Tel Aviv early this year and once again criticised Saudi hypocrisy towards the Palestinians²³. Kamal Khatib enjoys great respect within the movement. While allowing Ra'ed Salah to play the role of the charismatic leader, he is known as the linchpin of the organisation, and the head of all the community service activities. The multiple arrests of Ra'ed Salah have never been a problem. On the contrary, they pushed up his popularity.

"Trust and Reform" has not resumed all the activities formerly led by the Islamic movement, and it refrains from acting in Jerusalem from fear of being banned. But it helps maintain an Islamic socio-political offer and enjoys strong support in the country.

3 – Human Rights Organizations and the BDS Campaign: "the Enemies from Within"

Over the last decades the Israeli government has passed a series of laws restricting freedom of expression: the 2011 "Boycott Law" prohibited any expression of support for boycotting a person because of his/her ties to Israel or a territory under Israel's control; the 2011 "Nakba Law" sanctioned the commemoration of the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948; the 2016 "NGO Law" has forced organisations that receive more than half their funding from abroad to disclose it in official reports; the 2016 "Boycott Law" has allowed Israel to deny entry into its territory of any person calling for a boycott of Israel; the "Breaking the Silence Law" passed on 16 July 2018 forbids the anti-occupation association, which records human rights violations conducted by soldiers, to intervene in Israeli schools. This law stipulates that individuals and organisations that

²¹ www.arab48.com

²² <https://www.memri.org/tv/sheikh-kamal-khatib-slams-saudi-king-aid-houston-oppressors>

²³ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Anp9Kz-DuOw>

promote foreign prosecution against the Israeli army or "political acts against the State of Israel" are no longer allowed to intervene in schools. All these measures have been criticised by human rights groups which accuse the authorities of blocking democratic expression by criminalising critical and opposition voices. The leeway of opposition forces, especially those defending Palestinians, has become very limited. The judicialisation of politics²⁴ has taken the form of a "witch hunt", in which any opponent can be accused of "disloyalty", "treason" or even "terrorism".

Israeli Arab organisations, such as Mossawa²⁵, Adalah²⁶ and the Nazareth based Human Rights Association²⁷, have long been subject to attacks due to their activities criticising discrimination against Palestinians in Israel. The 2016 NGO Law has applied to 25 Israeli organisations, including almost all Arab human rights and advocacy groups²⁸. Some of their leaders have even been arrested or victims of police violence²⁹. Since the adoption of these laws, the attacks on free speech have escalated. Israeli left-wing organisations as a whole are now targeted, especially B'Tselem³⁰, Breaking the Silence and the New Israel Fund³¹. In early April 2018, Benyamin Netanyahu accused on his Facebook page the New Israel Fund (NIF) of "endangering the security and future of the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people" and of seeking "to eliminate the Jewish character of Israel in order to turn it into the state of all its citizens [resuming the rhetoric of Arab parties] alongside a Palestinian nation-state without Jews on the 1967 lines with Jerusalem as its capital"³².

Israeli left-wing associations are tracked by the 'NGO Monitor' website³³, which conducts a smear campaign in English, French and Hebrew, and does not hesitate to challenge their funders, including the French government. The far-right student organisation Im Tirtzu³⁴ demonizes the associations and people who support the

²⁴ Hélène Sallon, "La judiciarisation du politique en Israël : La promotion des revendications collectives arabes dans l'arène judiciaire", *Bulletin du Centre de recherche français de Jérusalem*, 2005, pp. 166-180.

²⁵ <http://www.mossawa.org>

²⁶ <https://www.adalah.org>

²⁷ <http://www.arabhra.org>

²⁸ Human Rights Watch, "Israel: Law targets Human Rights Groups", 13 July 2016. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/13/israel-law-targets-human-rights-groups>

²⁹ "Palestinian Civil Society Organizations in Israel: Demand Immediate Release of the Detained, Peaceful Protesters in Haifa and Investigation into the Use of Brutal, Excessive Force by Israeli Police against Them", Mossawa, 19 May 2018. <http://mossawa.org/en/article/view/756>

³⁰ Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.

³¹ Established in 1979 by Jewish American philanthropists, the New Israel Fund is a major donor to Jewish and Arab Israeli civil society.

³² Moran Azulay, "Netanyahu blames New Israel Fund of torpedoing Rwanda deal", *Ynet*, 3 April 2018. <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5219307,00.html>

³³ <https://www.ngo-monitor.org>

³⁴ <https://imti.org.il/en/about-us/movement/>

"Boycott, Divestment, Sanction" movement (BDS)³⁵. Their website includes a "NIF Watch" page that reports the direct or indirect actions of the New Israel Fund in favor of BDS. In 2013, they also published a report accusing some Israeli universities' "legal clinics" of defending "terrorists". The "clinic" of the University of Haifa, in which several lawyers from the association Adalah intervened, had been targeted. In 2016, based on their recommendations, the High Council for Education recommended that their sources of funding become public in order to avoid "foreign interference".

Many Palestinian activists in Israel support the boycott and are signatories of the "BDS From Within" appeal launched by Jewish and Arab Israeli citizens in 2008. As such, they are similarly targeted and criticised by those agreeing with Benjamin Netanyahu who, in 2015, defined them as a "strategic threat". In fact, BDS has not seriously impacted the Israeli economy, as foreign investments have continued to increase. BDS movement is mainly focused on cultural and academic fields and powered by activists based in Europe (particularly France and the United Kingdom) and the United States (especially on the west coast)³⁶. No partner government of Israel has supported BDS which is often defined as a "radical movement". But the anti-BDS obsession displayed by the Israeli Prime Minister, who cannot stand seeing his country compared to South Africa and thus excluded from the group of Western democracies, has offered it unexpected mediatisation.

The political success of the BDS campaign comes at a time when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deadlocked and the Israeli-American tandem is increasingly irritating the European diplomacy. In this context, the European Union (EU) is considered by some human rights activists, including Arab associations, as a reliable financial and political partner. Adalah receives, for example, EU support for the #WeWillNotBeSilent project that aims to promote young Arabs' freedom of speech: "to defend Arab youth by providing legal representation against violations of their freedom of expression rights in Israel, and by conducting media advocacy to Arabic, Hebrew and foreign media outlets to raise local and international awareness about their rights-violations"³⁷. The EU is therefore increasingly caricatured as a pro-Palestinian entity by some Israeli leaders.

³⁵ Launched in 2005 as an extension of the campaign for the academic and cultural boycott of Israel (PACBI) led by Omar Barghouti.

³⁶ Amit Efrati, "Who's Afraid of BDS? Economic and Academic Boycotts and the Threat to Israel", *INSS Strategic Assessment*, vol.19, n°4, January 2017. <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/whos-afraid-bds-economic-academic-boycotts-threat-israel/>

³⁷ <https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/8979>

4 – Is there a Risk of Intifada of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel?

Against the backdrop of this hardening of the Israel government's policy, the risk of internal uprising or Intifada is taken very seriously by Israeli security apparatus. In October 2000, 13 protesters who demonstrated in support of the outbreak of the second Intifada were killed in clashes with Israeli police. These violent riots raised the question of a possible "Intifada of the Arabs in Israel"³⁸. However, their mobilisation has been oriented towards citizen integration rather than revolution. Risks of massive uprising have therefore been very limited. But what are the risks today? While fully expressing their solidarity with the Palestinian cause, which possibility do they have to express their grievances against the Israeli state? Is political expression sufficient to mitigate the use of violence?

Each spike in violence in the Palestinian Territories results in demonstrations of support in the Arab regions of Israel. This was the case in 2015-2016 at the peak of the so-called « Stabbing Intifada », and even more recently in April-May 2018 during the Israeli crackdown on demonstrations along the security fence in Gaza. Demonstrations were organised throughout the country and sometimes ended in clashes and arrests. Arab protest therefore depends on developments in the Palestinian Territories and Jerusalem. Palestinians in Israel will certainly not be the epicenter of an upcoming Intifada, but they will not hesitate to take to the streets and face Israeli police.

The young Arab-Israeli generation is mostly defined as Palestinian, but they know just as well, if not better, than their elders, how to use the Israeli judicial and political system to assert their rights. In nearly twenty years, inter-Palestinian solidarity has increased³⁹, but it is still unlikely that this protest movement will lead to a mass uprising. The main reason is the lack of political leadership inclined to support and fuel a violent uprising. MPs refuse to support violence, the Islamic movement is closely monitored and human rights associations have chosen legal and international forms of struggle. Like their counterparts in the West Bank and Gaza, most Arab Israeli activists favour non-violent resistance and human rights claims in order to publicise and internationalise the Palestinian cause.

However, the anti-Jewish stabbing or car attacks which have been occurring since 2015, especially in southern West Bank and Jerusalem and sporadically in other Israeli cities,

³⁸ Laurence Louër, "Une Intifada des Arabes d'Israël ?", in Alain Dieckhoff, Remy Leveau (dir.), *Israéliens et Palestiniens. La guerre en partage*, Paris, Balland, 2003, p.153-180.

³⁹ Elisabeth Marteu, "Identité, solidarité et réseaux sociaux à l'épreuve des lignes de séparation : Etude des relations entre Palestiniens d'Israël et des Territoires occupés", in Cédric Parizot, Stéphanie Latte Abdallah (dir.), *A l'ombre du mur. Israéliens et Palestiniens entre séparation et occupation*, Paris, Actes Sud, 2011, pp. 203-228.

are expected to continue. Israeli security forces can do nothing against such isolated and spontaneous acts. Moreover, some sympathy for jihadist discourses, especially those of the Islamic State (IS), has emerged on social media since 2014. More than one hundred Israeli Arabs have been identified by the Israeli intelligence as supporters of IS, either because they have travelled to or prevented from going to Syria and Iraq, or because they have been arrested for supporting a terrorist organisation⁴⁰. In February 2018, two residents of Umm el-Fahm were convicted for planning to carry out an attack in Jerusalem⁴¹. Weapons and pro-IS propaganda were found in their homes. Before that, in July 2017, three other residents of Umm el-Fahm had killed two policemen at the entrance to the Esplanade of the Mosques in Jerusalem⁴².

In this context of deep distrust between Arab citizens and the Israeli state⁴³, the continuation of the Israel-Palestine conflict is likely to contribute to the radicalisation of both sides. The American President's support for the Israeli Prime Minister's policy, as exemplified on 14 May by the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, has consolidated Benjamin Netanyahu government's intransigence on the Palestinian issue. The Trump administration's 'blank check' written to Israel has mechanically been accompanied by greater foreclosure of public debate, reinforcing the current government's radicalism and the frustration nexus among Palestinians in Israel and in the occupied territories. Given the national and international contexts, there are reasons to believe that this situation is likely to deteriorate and lead to further democratic setbacks and ethno-confessional tensions.

⁴⁰ Elisabeth Marteu, "The Islamic State and Israel's Arab Citizens", *War on the Rocks*, December 6, 2016. <https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/the-islamic-state-and-israels-arab-citizens/>

⁴¹ Anna Ahronheim, "Shin Bet Foils ISIS-Inspired Attack on Temple Mount", *The Jerusalem Post*, 26 February 2018. <https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Terror-attack-on-Temple-Mount-thwarted-thanks-to-Shin-Bet-and-Police-543651>

⁴² Nir Hasson, Barak Ravid, Jack Khoury, « Two Israeli Police Officers Killed in Temple Mount Shooting, Another Wounded », *Haaretz*, 14 July 2017. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/two-police-officers-killed-in-temple-mount-shooting-another-wounded-1.5494146>

⁴³ Ilan Peleg, Dov Waxman, *Israel's Palestinians. The Conflict Within*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011.