Israel vs "Islamic Resistance"
The events currently unfolding in the Middle East are of a truly remarkable and historic nature. They have the potential to reshape the entire region for years, if not decades. The situation has evidently immediate and serious humanitarian consequences, representing the latest iteration of a long-standing and deeply entrenched conflict.
This paper aims to provide an analysis of the situation as of early October 2024, as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) enter Lebanese territory, and the first ground clashes occur with Hezbollah and other groups in Lebanon (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Harakat Amal or PLFP), aka the “Islamic Resistance”This paper is based in part on recent direct data from the various parties to the conflict (combat footages, claims, press releases, military documents) analyzed by the author.. To achieve this, it draws upon insights gained from past regional conflicts, including the 2006 war, with the assessment of emerging tactical challenges. This enables the formulation of medium-term perspectives and options.
Attrition: decapitation and downgrading of capacities
In addition to the significant discrepancies with the laws of war and the humanitarian protection of civilian populations – consistently impacted by so-called “precision strikes” –, the sabotage of electronic devices (beepers) by Israel represents a well-established and historically documented tactic. Only the scale of this attack is unprecedented. Intelligence services have always used a cascade of companies in several countries to combine discretion and efficiency of action. Sabotage of innocuous objects is standard practice, although it violates many aspects of international law: the Soviet army never hesitated in Afghanistan to disseminate objects that were in fact booby-traps.
However, a comparison with Israel’s past operational experience seems even more relevant. The concentration of Israeli military activity on the strategic and military targets of Hezbollah and other associated organizations is starkly divergent from that observed during the 2006 war. During that conflict, the IDF systematically struck at critical Lebanese infrastructures, including civilian ones. This shift in tactics could be indicative of both an improvement in the IDF’s target acquisition and strike performance (Effects-based operations/EBOs) and, correlatively, an increase in the redundancy of Hezbollah’s structures. The consequences of current IDF military operations will differ in Gaza and Southern Lebanon. The population density in Gaza is much higher than in Lebanon, and thus it appears that Hamas structures are much more intertwined with the locals than those of Hezbollah, particularly in southern Lebanon.
The neutralization of the leadership of violent non-state organizations, or more narrowly, terrorist organizations, groups, or networks, is also a widespread and well-documented security conceptSee, for instance, Jenna Jordan, Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations, Stanford University Press, 2019.. This has even led to the development of specific doctrines and dedicated weapons systems, in particular drones. Several famous examples are demonstrative. They show that targets can be geolocated – for example, by their telephones or IPs (SIGINT) –, thus exposed to remote strikes (Dzhokhar Dudayev (1996), Abu Mussab Al-Zarkawi (2006), Al-Zawahiri (2022)). Moving from a pragmatic dimension to a systematic doctrinal conception, the Obama administration significantly expanded the use of drone elimination operations through the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and YemenSee Jaclyn Tander, “Known and unknowns: President Obama’s lethal drone doctrine”, Notes de la FRS, n° 7/2013, April 2013..
The Israeli action was conducted in two phases. Initially, a certain number of Hezbollah fighters were neutralized using their beepers and other outdated communication systems, including walkie-talkies. This suggests that Hezbollah has minimal concern about exposing its fighters to enemy electromagnetic eavesdroppingOn Hezbollah’s multifaceted aspects, see Joseph Daher, Hezbollah: The Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God, Pluto Press, London, 2016.. In this context, the term “minimal” is used to describe the application of Iranian standards of security and clandestine communications, which are understood to be inferior to those employed by Israel and the West, while retaining a certain level of practicality.
The disorganization of Hezbollah through its means of communication is also indicative of what this organization is all about: a high-profile political organization, a quasi-party, with global support among Shi’a/Lebanese diasporas, and simultaneously, an armed wing with a clandestine component. It would have been unfeasible to undertake such a coercive operation against, for instance, ISIS circa 2015. This group, even “territorialized”, was much more clandestine and less equipped with communication and digital technologies. The decision by Hezbollah, particularly following 2006, to progressively reveal a significant portion of its political and strategic apparatus to the public, to the extent that several of its leading figures perceived themselves as a form of Lebanese “Irish Republican Army”, ultimately proved disadvantageous. At the same time, Israel came to recognize the value in developing a more comprehensive and accurate database of targets and objectives.
For any non-state armed group, even those with electoral ambitions, excessive transparency can be fatal. This lesson will undoubtedly be applicable on a global scale, noticeably in Iran and North Korea. In the case of Hezbollah, moreover, the organization’s particularly formalized pyramid structure has provided a plethora of actionable data for adversary intelligence. It seems realistic to suggest that Hezbollah’s command, control, communications and information (C3I) structures may have become more resilient and redundant over time, while as geographically extended as possible, given the limited size of Lebanon. In contrast, there is evidence that the Israeli capacity has increased exponentially, including with new “bunker busters” manufactured in the United States.
In addition, the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon is used for the assembly or covert storage of certain equipment and known for a tolerance for narcotics production. Syria has been utilized as a transit point for Iranian military equipment, drone piloting training, and military training. Numerous Syrian-Lebanese crossing points (some underground) have been destroyed by the IDF, for example adjacent to Masnaa crossing. Additionally, a recent Israeli commando operation in Syrian territory suggests the existence of clandestine weapons manufacturing or reengineeringEve Sampson, “How Israeli forces destroyed a secret weapons facility in Syria”, New York Times, 23 September 2024.. Israeli strikes have significantly altered the landscape in recent weeks, with some rough still unconfirmed assessments indicating that at least 50 to 70 percent of Hezbollah’s arsenal, particularly all-caliber rockets, has been destroyed. For the time being, however, Hezbollah is still able to strike daily with its rockets at a group of settlements (Kiryat Yam, BialikSanjana Varghese, Malachy Browne, “Video shows Hezbollah missile hit residential area in Northern Israel”, New York Times, 22 September 2024., Motzkim, Ata, Aim, Shmuel), populated by 250,000 settlers, in the Bay of Haifa.
The elimination of the upper echelons of Hezbollah’s management (including its leader, Sheikh Nasrallah, as well as middle-ranking and senior military officials) has already far-reaching implications. Some of these have been observed on other occasions:
- The immediate disorganization and slowdown in the flow of decision-making information. It seems reasonable to assume that all the “anti-Zionist” organizations in Israel’s immediate vicinity are in a similar situation. The duration of this disorganization effect is contingent upon resilience, as well as the duration and intensity of the adversarial attacks.
- Inhibition of other non-state armed groups leadership. To survive, some leaders will adopt a more cautious approach, at least for the foreseeable future.
The attrition of Hezbollah and Hamas is really a game changer: any non-state armed organization will undoubtedly draw the conclusion that increasing clandestinity is a necessity to survive. This will have consequences for the ability of intelligence agencies to observe and analyze. Considering the evolving situation, it is understandable that certain states, Iran being a notable example, have already taken steps to enhance the protection of their political leadership. In the medium term, some states will reassess the resilience of their underground bunkers in a systematic way.
Security first, peace in limbo
Israel is looking for security first, then peace. This security is based on the attrition of the “anti-Zionist” organizations surrounding Israel and even Iran. This latter aspect is envisaged and negotiated with others, such as the United States. It is also defined in the coercive “dialogue” with Tehran, in this exchange of – admittedly less and less – graduated responses. This tit-for-tat actions and reactions mode could switch into something more extreme and uncontrolled.
The next – emerging? – stage is the occupation of southern Lebanon, in a kind of replay of the 2006 warFor a general view of the 2006 war, see Khair El-Din Haseeb, “The Israeli‐Lebanese war of 2006 and its repercussions: an overview”, Contemporary Arab Affairs, vol. 1, n° 2, 2008, pp. 169-186. – but with Hezbollah paradoxically weaker – and Israeli military operations (alone or accompanied by others) against Iran. In any case, Iranian attacks do not seem to be having unbearable consequences for Israel, judging by the first two strikes, using remotely operated munitions, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.
A rather large technological inadequacy of Iranian missiles is observable for now, with sometimes a lack of accuracy on the targets. Iran seems however to have used “airbust” warheads against some military basesGeoff Brumfiel, “Satellite images show dozens of Iranian missiles struck near Israeli base”, OPB News, 4 October 2024. (Israeli Nevatim and Tel Nof airbases) and possibly against some intelligence buildings. In general, the impact does not seem more visible than the German Blitz against London with V1s and V2s – i.e. largely symbolic, materially not significant. Unsurprisingly, these attacks arouse a certain exaltation, associated with the Shi’a traditional aesthetics of martyrdom, both in the pro-Hezbollah and pro-Iranian social mediaOn some pro-Iranian Telegram channels in particular..
However, a subsequent, more robust analysis may shed light on how the IDF have employed their most innovative anti-missile Arrow systems, and whether, given their limited number, it has utilized them for specific priorities. It may also provide more precise details of the Iranian ballistic missiles launched in relation to their intended targets (anti-force or soft targets).
If the IDF have a monopoly on air superiority, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), and if Israel and its allies are quite successful in inhibiting Iranian ballistic strikes, tactical ground combat remains challenging.
History repeats itself. South Lebanon has always stood out for its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel invaded in 1948-1949 (Operation Hiram). In the 1970s, the area came under the control of Palestinian groups (Fatahland), then was occupied by Israel from 1982 to June 2000, to the extent that the local population was reduced by a factor of 10 through emigration. This contributed to the strengthening of Hezbollah’s (and other groups’) presence throughout the world. It was then dominated politically and militarily by Hezbollah, which made it its stronghold and launched sporadic attacks against Israel from there. In July 2006, Israel entered the area for some thirty days, then withdrew.
A hypothetical full-scale invasion of southern Lebanon – rather than a limited ground incursion – would be based on the same geographical considerations as the 2006 war. This would include the strategic importance of certain towns or villages, tactical mobility, and the use of Hezbollah infantrymen to conduct ambushes around villages and towns that could act as fixation points. The 2006 war, sometimes described as “the harbinger of future conflicts”, demonstrated the adaptive nature of irregular adversaries in the face of conventional superiority. This may also be the case in the present day, despite the considerable attrition that Hezbollah has suffered. Its semi-autonomous cells, equipped with anti-tank weapons, automatic rifles, sniping capability, and the ability to produce IEDs, would present numerous tactical advantages in a large-scale fight against the IDF. These advantages would be enhanced by the groups’ familiarity with the terrain and the local population: in essence, Hezbollah can rely on a combination of techno-guerrilla warfareWe define this concept as the combination of old guerrilla techniques with modern technologies that are more commonly associated to states., ambushes, pitfalls, fast-paced combat, anti-personnel mines in depth (in 2006, on seven kilometers, to the North) and IEDs. As observed in 2006, Hezbollah’s defensive system could encompass two defensive lines – one along the border with Israel and the other, South along the Litani River, to the coastTo know more on Hezbollah military doctrine against Israel, see Masaab Al-Aloosy, “Deterrence by insurgents: Hezbollah’s military doctrine and capability vis-à-vis Israel”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 33, n° 6, 2022, pp. 999-1016..
Conclusion: what comes next?
Whatever the subsequent scenarios – Israeli attacks on oil, military or strategic critical targets in Iran, alone or with the United States, and various domino effects (rising energy prices among others), Iranian response (diminuendo or crescendo, e.g. blocking/mining the Strait of Hormuz or another ballistic attack, terrorism with proxies) –, some problems will remain unresolved:
- For now, the conditions for long-term regional peace are unlikely to be achieved. It is not even sure that parties to the conflict – the Israeli government and Hamas – want peace.
- The security of Israel’s immediate surroundings will be improved for a few years, since the general idea behind its counter-terrorism approach is to set back the operational capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah by fourty years. However, security is not guaranteed in the long run and root causes are here to stay
. - Iranian WMD program will continue to develop, even though Teheran proxies are decisively eroded. Nuclear asymmetry is a factor in this context, as Iran would only require a few nuclear bombs to inflict significant damage upon Israel (the same cannot be said of Israel in the event of a nuclear attack against Iranian territory).
- The current instability may provide an opportunity for substantial regional transformations, potentially more so than in Gaza. From a Western perspective, the election of a new Lebanese President and the emergence of new political organizations in southern Lebanon, including those that are not Shi’a, should be encouraged.
- People displaced by the conflict is a truly historic problem. An estimated 1.2 million people have fled Southern Lebanon and the Beirut region. Around 60,000 Israeli were forced to leave their homes in Northern Israel, but should be able to come back soon or later. The situation is far worse in Gaza. While certain migration flows are crystallizing in the direction of Europe or elsewhere, European states are hesitating – as ever? – between morality and security: how can we be sure that displaced persons from these war-torn territories are not militants – always possibly dangerous or opposed to Western values, – of Hamas, Hezbollah or similar organizations?
Crédits photo : @Shutterstock
